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Executive summary 
 
The Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP), which began in 2005, is a novel and ambitious 
approach to increase the proportion of supervised deliveries through transport incentives, worker 
incentives for attending deliveries and facility payments (free deliveries) in the 25 districts with the 
lowest HDI. Some progress is reported in increasing the percentage of deliveries by a trained health 
professional, although levels of delivery with health professionals remain low. The GoN is now 
committed to extend the programme to include free delivery at facilities for all women whilst still 
retaining the transport incentive.  In future the programme will be known as Ama (meaning 
‘mother’).  
 
The aim of this report is to provide a critical reflection on the ways in which the SDIP has been 
implemented and their implications for the extension to free delivery. The report also takes account 
of wider policy issues, including free care and future moves to decentralise the government of the 
country. It was commissioned by DfID, who have committed considerable resources to reducing 
financial barriers to access to safe delivery care, with a view to provide evidence to inform the 
development, implementation and monitoring of the free delivery policy and safe delivery incentive 
scheme. Its intended audience is programme policy makers, managers and funders, including DfID 
and MoHP 
 
A number of challenges and concerns have arisen during SDIP implementation, which could also 
impact on the successor free delivery programme unless action is taken. These include: 
• Mismanagement of home delivery payments 
• Low reimbursement of free delivery component   
• Continuing financial barriers for households 
• Continued poor access to care of adequate quality, especially in rural areas 
• On-going non-financial barriers for households 
• Unequal impact by economic status, with the middle groups benefiting most in terms of 
increased utilisation of services (although gap between middle and poor was relatively small) 
• Only modest increases in institutional deliveries to date 
• Weak monitoring, accountability and transparency systems 
• Concerns about financial sustainability of the system with funding continuing to rely on EDP 
(DfID) resources 
The cash incentive to offset the demand-side costs (e.g. transport and other out-of-pocket expenses) 
is the most novel part of the SDIP. During the early stages of the SDIP implementation there were 
some problems in getting cash to women, but after modifying transfer arrangements delays were 
reduced substantially. Evidence suggests that these payments offset part of the direct costs of 
delivery at a facility. They remain insufficient to have a substantial impact on the overall cost of care 
– including demand side costs - particularly in mountain and hill areas.   
 
Incentive payments to health workers have proved problematic. They have created tension between 
those receiving payments and those that do not and appear also to have led to inefficient staff 
rotations to give more staff a share of the revenue. Incentives may be difficult to remove unless 
alternative ways can be provided to give an equivalent incentive to improve working conditions and 
quality of care. The mis-reporting of home deliveries makes the payment to those undertaking these 
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deliveries particularly hard to justify and the decision to abolish such incentives appears to be 
defendable on these grounds. 
 
The proposal to offer free delivery throughout the country has the advantage that it will channel 
resources to facilities rather than individual staff members.  Available information on costing 
suggests that the tariffs proposed of NRs 700 for a normal delivery, NRS 3,000 for a complication and 
NRS 7,000 for a caesarean section are in line with the recurrent costs of care. Costing also supports 
the payment of the higher rate of NRs 1,000 per normal delivery to BEOC facilities.  Referral cases are 
problematic and will need careful monitoring. There is concern that limiting the payment only to the 
facility of final care could reduce the incentive to refer. Similarly, limiting the payment of transport 
incentives to the first facility only could deter women from seeking vital care. The prospect of abuse 
(over-referral or phantom referrals) has to be weighed against the potentially more serious health 
problem of inadequate referral. Access to timely high quality care is critical to saving lives and 
reducing serious morbidity, and all opportunities to delay the decision to refer need to be removed. 
 
The inclusion of the private sector will challenge the government’s capacity to monitor the quality 
and quantity of services. At the same time, if undertaken gradually it offers an excellent opportunity 
to improve the monitoring of the private sector and to increase the availability of services. Initial 
(certification) requirements to qualify to provide services through the programme could be 
supplemented in a later stage by more advanced accreditation requirements. The MoHP is starting to 
develop the capacity and willingness to contract with non-state actors to provide services in 
underserved areas.  
 
Free delivery is developing at the same time as the roll-out of free care to higher level (district and 
above) services. It is too early to propose integrating these initiatives. More evaluation of the free 
care initiative is required, including whether sufficient funds have been provided to make it 
sustainable and fully operational. Free delivery could be undermined by hasty integration. Gradual 
steps towards integration should be followed, beginning with integration of financial and activity 
monitoring systems.  
 
Even the best payment schemes have perverse incentives to provide the wrong types of services or 
misreport activity. Misreporting, identified during SDIP, can be reduced by getting rid of the home 
delivery payment but this does not in any way reduce the need to improve and properly resource 
reporting and supervision systems.  The misreporting of complication rates is a particular concern 
with the new system.  Payments to facilities, public and private, must be made conditional on 
compliance with reporting requirements, including the new Ama guidelines and existing HMIS and 
EOC ones. FHD must receive adequate support to supervise and analyse information at national, 
regional and district levels.   
 
The overall cost of the Free Delivery programme, including monitoring and evaluation (at constant 
prices) is expected to increase from NRS 441 in 2009/10 to NRS 748 million in 2017/18. Given the 
importance of the programme to GoN, it is important that an increasing proportion is financed from 
the government regular budget. There will likely remain a substantial gap to be filled from other 
sources, mainly EDPs.  GoN and EDPs will need to agree a financing plan to ensure the sustainability 
of the programme over the next ten years.  
 
The main conclusions and recommendations of this study are as follows: 
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Cash payments to households 
 The cash payments to households should continue in the medium term, and should continue 
to be tiered by ecological zone. These amounts can stay as at present (50% of average actual 
costs), but over time, if response is much higher in the tarai, compared to the upland areas, 
the amounts could be rebalanced to increase the support for the hills and mountains (with a 
possible reduction in the tarai). 
Payments to health staff for facility deliveries 
 The decision to build staff payments into facility payments is wise. We recommend that a 
portion of the facility payment equivalent to the previous NRs 300 paid to staff is set aside 
for quality improvements. These can include benefits for staff, individually or as a team, but 
should not be automatic. Some should also be used to make the small changes which can 
make so much difference to users.  
Payments to health staff for home deliveries 
 The payments to staff for home deliveries have not furthered the original objectives of the 
SDIP, and we support their removal. This change must be complemented however by 
renewed investment in increasing access to facilities (roads, health care infrastructure, staff 
skills etc.).  
National free delivery component 
 This new approach should reduce the high facility costs which users face and should 
therefore improve the progress in increasing facility-based deliveries. 
 Current tariffs are broadly in line with the costing estimates and with current user fees 
 The costing justifies a higher rate (NRs 1,000) for BEOC/CEOC centres. 
 All tariffs should be reviewed in one year, however, to allow for fine-tuning of the rates (and 
to allow for a broader review of early implementation experiences). 
 All payments should be dependent on compliance with quality standards, monitoring and 
auditing. 
 The extent of the free care should be clearly elaborated for women and for facilities (exactly 
which cost components are included, and for which services, pre-, intra- and post-partum, 
and for neonatal care). There are currently some small areas of ambiguity. 
 There should be close monitoring of the CS rates and of different types of complications, to 
assess whether there is an undue increase in CS, and/or misreporting of categories of 
delivery. (This means adding the 10 complication categories to the form in annexe 3 of the 
current guidelines.) 
 Both referring and referral institutions should receive payments, as both will incur treatment 
costs. Referring facilities should be paid at normal delivery rates and referral ones according 
to the complication treated. Close monitoring and auditing will be required to ensure that 
‘phantom referrals’ do not occur.  
 Similarly, women who are referred should receive two sets of transport payment as they will 
incur two sets of travel costs. The second payment should be made on arrival at the referral 
centre. 
 The smooth transfer of funds – already an issue under the SDIP – will become of even 
greater importance with the free delivery component, and with the inclusion of a wider 
range of providers (see below). Systems for assuring it will be of prime importance for the 
functioning of the policy. 
 Supervision forms should include checks on whether details of the policy and local recipients 
are being clearly displayed at facilities (this could be added to annexe 6: the supervision 
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checklist). Other useful additions/alterations to the current reporting forms could include a 
record of maternity staff (annexe 5: quarterly district report). 
 While facilities are free to manage their own funds, it would be useful to have reports of how 
they have been used. Reporting of use of Ama funds could, for example, follow three simple 
categories (service costs; staff benefits; quality improvements for users), so that the 
utilisation of resources can be tracked retrospectively and guidelines adapted in response. 
 A new communication strategy will need to be developed as the re-design of the SDIP is 
quite extensive, and will take time, and some resources, to disseminate. The SDIP should 
collaborate with the NHEICC on this. 
 While the budget for the SDIP/Ama for 2008-9 is fully funded, there will be little surplus left, 
on current projections of uptake, from existing EDP commitments. It is therefore urgent that 
financial planning starts soon for FY 2009-10, with support for the new policy sought from a 
range of potential sources, including the GoN.  
 The importance of continuing investment in extending the supply network and improving the 
availability and quality of care is emphasised here, and the cost implications elaborated.  
 The checklist in annexe 2 may be useful for periodic reviews of progress in the development 
of the Ama programme. 
Integration with free basic health care and decentralisation 
 The Ama services are already provided in an integrated way, but funding streams are 
separate. In the short term, this should be preserved, as the wider free care policy is 
developed and established. 
 In the meantime, there should be a focus on supported integrated planning and monitoring 
of different health programmes by the district team. This is happening in theory at present, 
but not always in practice. Integrated reporting on monitoring funds should also be a 
priority. 
 At national and facility level, funding for free care will affect the SDIP/Ama and vice versa, so 
it is important to document their combined impact and the degree of cross-subsidisation 
from one to another. Maternity care is a core services and has traditionally been an 
important profit-making activity. The important lessons learned through the SDIP process 
and internationally on the removal of fees should be absorbed by those responsible for 
implementing the free care programme.  
 In the longer term, and particularly as the GoN assumes a greater proportion of the funding 
burden for the Ama programme, the funding flows can be integrated at national level. The 
series of steps for this integration are set out in the report. 
 In preparation for whatever form federalism and decentralisation come to take in Nepal, we 
recommend that the Ama programme supports the piloting of local ‘women’s health’ funds, 
to be co-managed by HFMC and women’s organisations. They could receive a small 
component (such as NRs 100) from the payment per delivery (thus creating an incentive to 
boost demand for institutional deliveries). The funds could be used to increase awareness of 
the new Ama programme, and to tackle locally identified blocks to service uptake (e.g. 
means of providing warm food at the birthing centre; making centres more comfortable for 
companion to stay in; assistance where onward referral costs are beyond the family’s means 
etc.). These funds should ideally be matched by VDC contributions, to increase local 
ownership of the Ama cause. Routine monitoring of VDC contributions would enable 
programme managers to assess progress. Ultimately, those jointly managed funds could be 
expanded if wider decentralisation and integration of funding streams occurs. 
 Paradoxically, decentralisation usually creates a need to strengthen vertical ‘technical’ 
controls at the same time as horizontal links are being pursued. Enforcing financial and 
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activity reporting to the national level, from districts, will be an important part of that 
process.  
Inclusion of the private sector 
 There is now one year’s worth of experience of including the PNFP sector and private 
medical colleges in the SDIP. The patterns of uptake should be analysed for early lessons on 
the potential contribution of non-state partners. 
 The inclusion of the private sector, if carefully, managed, offers opportunities for extending 
access, improving integration, and raising quality in the longer term. 
 We recommend that initially a uniform tariff for public and non-public providers is offered, 
but with a commitment to review this approach within 2 years and possibly develop a more 
sophisticated mechanism. 
 Facilities should meet HMIS, EOC and Ama reporting guidelines, if they are to receive 
payments under the scheme. At present, some report, but most do not. 
 It should also be clear that no payments can be accepted by participating facilities for 
delivery care, unless it is part of a separate ‘luxury’ package, where full costs are paid by 
clients for care in cabins (private rooms). 
 The inclusion should rest on a two-stage accreditation process, in which basic quality 
standards (as specified in the current guidelines) are the first requirement for entry, but with 
an agreement that over 1-2 years, there will be a move to more sophisticated service 
standards.  
 TA will be needed over the intervening period to develop this accreditation process, which 
should form the basis for agreements with public sector providers too. 
 In future, there may be opportunity to develop contracts with the private sector to develop 
new services in under-served areas, with government support for set-up costs. The 
implications of this go beyond the SDIP/Ama – these are sector-wide and multi-sectoral 
issues. 
 Some of the monitoring and audit roles – particularly for periodic independent checking of 
functioning - can also be contracted to private organisations and NGOs. 
 The same paradox that applied to decentralisation (which needs a stronger centre) applies to 
developing a stronger public-private partnership: public sector capacity to develop and 
manage contracts with the private sector must be strengthened for the partnership to work 
effectively (and this has implications well beyond the safe motherhood sub-sector). 
Monitoring, evaluation and further research 
 Monitoring will be a key to the success of the Ama programme. It is therefore highly 
recommended that capacity is developed, at district, regional and national level, to monitor 
and audit the Ama programme. There are currently a few key individuals who carry out such 
work very effectively, but this capacity must be broadened and institutionalised, if the 
programme is to be sustained.  
 Monitoring costs should not be under-estimated. Something in the region of 10% of the Ama 
costs should be added for M&E. 
 A range of monitoring and tracking tools should be used, including routine monitoring, spot 
checks within routine supervision, periodic rapid reviews at community level, annual auditing 
and more formal evaluation.  
 The current forms are well developed. Some minor changes have been suggested, such as 
tracking the different types of complications; and monitoring (with simple categories) the 
use of the Ama funds by facilities. 
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 Evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the Ama programme will be difficult, primarily 
because of the difficulty of attributing change in a dynamic situation, with multiple 
interventions, and no control areas. We therefore recommend a focus on tracking costs and 
tracking a range of intermediate output indicators, to give a more pragmatic assessment of 
value for money.  
 We suggest that process based rapid reviews are undertaken on a six monthly basis. 
Available time series HMIS and other data should be collected on a regular basis to permit an 
interim evaluation after the first 18 months of implementation. We also suggest that a larger 
scale evaluation that looks at the effect on utilisation and household finances is undertaken 
after the first 2-3 years of implementation. To ensure adequate baseline data, early 
preparations for this evaluation should be taken, including quality of care data (which may 
be available from on-going SSMP studies).  
 Case studies on health facility financing (particularly at hospital level) would assist in 
understanding the likely impact on the hospital economy and would help with planning a 
more integrated approach to free care generally. At present, for example, there is no 
systematic reporting of revenues from user fees or local government sources, so predicting 
the impact of free care policies is difficult. (For example, it is hard to tell whether the free 
drugs list is having perverse incentives, such as increased prescription of off-list drugs.) This 
would also provide useful information for future decentralisation discussions, providing 
information on patterns of revenue and expenditure by facility type and by region. 
 Similarly, very little is known on how health worker support themselves in Nepal, and a 
survey on health workers incentives, and how these link to working practices, would provide 
useful policy information for planning future initiatives. (For example, it would be good to 
know whether free care has any impact on dual practice by public health workers.) 
 The SDIP has benefited from close collaboration with technical support partners and this 
collaboration will continue to be important as the programme evolves into this new phase 
with new challenges. 
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Introduction 
 
Despite an increase in national rates of coverage from 10% to 20% between 1996 and 2006, 
the overall proportion of women in Nepal delivering with a skilled health professional has 
been low. Moreover, the gap between the highest and lowest income quintiles increased by 
21% between 1996 and 2006, reflecting continuing socio-economic and geographical 
barriers. In 2006, the poorest quintile used only 6.4% of total SBA-assisted delivery services, 
according to Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data (Health sector reform support 
programme 2008). Utilisation of facilities for delivery ranged from less than 5% for the 
lowest quintile to nearly 30% for the highest. 
 
According to the DHS, the maternal mortality ratios (MMR) in Nepal declined from 539 in 
1996 to 281 in 2006.  This has been attributed to a number of factors, including a fall in 
fertility, legalisation of abortion (in 2002), increase in family planning (FP) acceptance, 
increases in ante-natal care (ANC) and immunisation, and a three-fold increase in nurse-
assisted deliveries in rural areas (Pant et al. 2008).  
 
The Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP), which was started in Nepal in 2005, was an 
ambitious national approach to increasing the proportion of deliveries attended by a skilled 
birth attendant (SBA). The SDIP to date has combined three key features: 
 Demand-side financing (cash transfers to women to cover part of their access costs, 
varied by geographical terrain) 
 Health worker incentives (for facility and home deliveries) 
 Fee exemption (in low human development index (HDI) areas) 
 
While all of these elements have been used in other countries individually, the Nepal policy 
has been unusual in combining all three elements. It is also unusual in that eligibility for cash 
transfers has been universal (conditional cash transfers are commonly targeted by some 
criteria of vulnerability).  
 
The SDIP has been well documented, including in a thorough evaluation (Powell-Jackson et 
al. 2008). The evaluation raised a number of implementation concerns, but found that the 
SDIP had had a positive impact, with women who had been exposed to the SDIP 24% more 
likely to deliver in a health facility, 13% more likely to be delivered by an SBA and 5% less 
likely to have a home delivery.  
 
The Government of Nepal, in partnership with the UK Department for International 
Development (DfID), and with technical support from SSMP/Options, is to be commended 
not just for its support for this innovative programme but also for its willingness to adapt 
and strengthen the SDIP over time in response to emerging issues. Already, within the first 
three years of its life, a number of important alterations have been made to the policy, 
including: 
 Modification of the SDIP fund flow mechanism from DfID to MoHP 
 Removal of the conditionality that a woman must have fewer than two live children 
to qualify for cash assistance or exempted fees 
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 Strengthened programme and financial monitoring 
 Extension from public to private not-for-profit facilities 
 
In a spirit of continued adaptation and expansion, the GoN is now considering a further set 
of possible changes. These include (collectively known as the Ama programme): 
 The removal of all fees for all types of delivery services, nationwide 
 The extension of eligibility to join the scheme to private for profit facilities 
 Changes to the existing system of paying incentives to health workers, particularly in 
relation to home deliveries 
 
The aim of this report is to provide critical reflection on these options, and to advise on the 
cost implications and sustainability of the SDIP and related policies in future, taking into 
account wider contextual changes, such as the extension of free care more generally in 
Nepal and moves towards decentralisation. 
 
The content of the report is derived from key informant interviews conducted in November 
2008 (see annexe 1), secondary reports (see references), and wider international 
experience. 
 
Identifying the challenges 
 
In order to inform future changes, it is necessary to be clear about the challenges which face 
the SDIP and any successor or linked policies. Notwithstanding the success that the SDIP has 
had, there are a number of intrinsic and extrinsic factors which continue to raise concerns. 
These are discussed briefly here. 
Misuse of home delivery payments 
A recent rapid assessment by CREHPA found that 8% of incentive payments to health 
workers for institutional deliveries and 71% of payments for home deliveries were 
fraudulent (CREHPA 2008). The survey was not small-scale and was non-random in its 
selection of clusters, so these figures have to be treated carefully. However, they clearly 
indicate some systemic weaknesses and confirm earlier concerns expressed in the 
evaluation at the rate of increase of reported home deliveries. The majority of false reports 
were at SHP level. Supervision of these community-based staff (mostly MCHWs), often 
based in remote locations with poor transport links to higher levels of the health system, 
clearly poses a major challenge.   
Low uptake of free delivery component to date 
The SDIP evaluation found that the component with lowest uptake was the offer of free 
delivery services (fee exemption) in the 25 low-HDI districts. The reasons for this poor 
uptake are not entirely clear, but should be investigated, as they may have implications for 
the decision to roll out fee exemption nationally. It is however possible that low uptake was 
a transitional feature, reflecting the process of roll-out: the evaluation found that 26% of 
deliveries were reimbursed in surveyed low-HDI districts the first year of operation, but did 
not collect data for subsequent years. Cash flow difficulties in the first year may be partly 
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responsible for this disappointing performance. Delays and inadequacies of funding, 
particularly at the start of the SDIP, are well documented in the process evaluation report 
(Powell-Jackson et al. 2007). 
Continuing financial barriers for households 
The cash transfers to households to cover access costs, while innovative and generous, were 
not able to address all household financial barriers. The SDIP evaluation found that, in one 
district, the cash incentive represented less than 20% of out-of-pocket expenditure on 
institutional delivery care. This district was not one of the low-HDI ones, however, so one 
would expect that the proportion was higher in those exempted areas. 
Continued low access to quality care, especially in rural areas  
Geographical access to facilities which can offer skilled attendants and other components 
necessary for safe delivery (including BEOC and CEOC) remains poor. Nepal has 4 national 
hospitals; four regional hospitals; 8 zonal hospitals; 65 district hospitals (of which only 38 
have BEOC and 13 have CEOC); 168 PHCC (of which only 42 offer BEOC); 696 Health Posts 
(some with birthing centres); and 3,129 SHP. 11 districts have no roads at all. Only 3 districts 
in the 25 low-HDI areas offered CS care, at the start of the SDIP evaluation (Powell-Jackson, 
Tiwari, Neupane, Morrison, & Costello 2007).  
 
If access to health care is defined as living within 45 minutes’ walk of a health sub-post, only 
60% of the country has access, according to the Living Standards Survey (but health sub-
posts do not contain staff trained as SBAs, so the situation for delivery care is much worse).  
 
Nepal needs to train 4,088 SBAs by 2012 to achieve its goal of 60% of deliveries attended by 
SBAs. There were staff shortages in the region of 47% for doctors, 22% for nurses and 9% for 
ANMs (in 2005/6). Considerable investments are being made in upgrading facilities and 
training staff, including through the SSMP, but further progress will be needed to 
complement any policies to address financial barriers.  
Non-financial barriers for households 
The SDIP evaluation and other reports attest to the importance of other barriers (in addition 
to cost and distance) which contribute to low supervised delivery rates in Nepal.  When 
asked (in the 2006 DHS) why they had not delivered in a health facility, 73% of women said 
that they believed it was not necessary. Only 10% cited cost as a factor. It is unrealistic 
therefore to expect the SDIP to tackle these non-financial barriers directly, without 
complementary approaches (and over a longer time). However, the design of new 
implementation modes could to some extent address issues of acceptability and cultural 
barriers. 
Equity issues 
The SDIP evaluation finds that the impact of the SDIP on utilisation of SBAs was greatest for 
the middle quintiles. This may be linked to informal discrimination against paying poorer 
women, as well as other barriers faced by the poor. Amongst those eligible to receive cash 
transfers, women with no education, unaware of the SDIP, living more than one hour away 
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and Dalits were less likely to receive the cash. The universal design also means that women 
in richer households are receiving an ‘unnecessary’ subsidy. This ‘leakage’ will be 
exacerbated by a universal exemption approach (combined with continued cash payments 
to women). 
Limited increase in facility deliveries 
The HMIS points to an increase in facility deliveries during the period of SDIP introduction. 
This increase has however been relatively limited (reflecting some of the factors mentioned 
above), with some particular concerns raised about the hill areas, where no significant 
increase was found in facility deliveries. In addition, some of the increase may reflect 
women switching from private to public sectors.  
 
The biggest increase has been in home deliveries supervised by a trained health worker. The 
problem is (a) that these figures are distorted by over-reporting for financial incentive 
reasons (i.e. reflect an artificial rise for home deliveries which were previously under-
reported) and (b) that many of the personnel supervising these deliveries are not fully 
trained in safe delivery techniques and lack access to life-saving services, if required.  This is 
reflected in the fact that the evaluation found no increase in caesarean section rates. The 
health benefits of the policy for women are therefore hard to assess. Many of the same staff 
were previously supervising deliveries in the community, but were not reporting them, as 
the delivery was a purely private transaction. They may now have been motivated to report 
the deliveries, but whether there has been a ‘real’ increase in home-based supervised 
deliveries is hard to tell from present data. 
Motivating and retaining health workers 
Motivation and retention of health workers is a global issue, particularly in remote areas 
with poor infrastructure, such as is found in the upland areas of Nepal. Due to low 
population density and access problems in such areas, health worker productivity is also 
typically low. The payment of incentives to health workers was intended to boost 
productivity. However, as noted, such payments are hard to monitor and are quickly 
perceived to be part of the expected pay. Any reforms have to balance accountability with 
ensuring that health workers feel motivated and do not suffer financially from changes to 
charging regimes.  
Weak monitoring and accountability systems 
Monitoring financial flows and outputs is a challenge to all health systems. The SDIP process 
evaluation found that monitoring had been poor and that additional support and resources 
for effective monitoring were needed (Powell-Jackson, Tiwari, Neupane, Morrison, & 
Costello 2007). Technical support has since been provided to strengthen management and 
monitoring of the SDIP. However, future changes will place further demands. In addition to 
vertical communication and control, stronger local accountability mechanisms will be 
needed. 
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Sustainability 
The initial financial commitment to the SDIP came from DfID. In the last three years, 
however, the GoN contribution has been increasing, rising to 40% of the SDIP budget for FY 
2008-9. While this is an extremely positive development, the addition of national free 
delivery care will add considerably to the national programme cost. The GoN needs to plan 
for how the programme can be sustained in the long term, with support from DfID and other 
EDPs. 
 
Moving ahead – discussion of SDIP development issues 
Cash payments to households 
At present, women are given a cash hand-out when they deliver in an eligible facility (from 
national hospital to health post level, and in a few SHPs with birthing centres). The sum is 
determined by the ecological zone (NRs 500 for tarai, NRs 1000 for hills and NRs 1,500 for 
mountains). The money was intended to cover transport and access costs. Evidence from the 
SDIP evaluation suggests that the funds were commonly used to fund part of the fees and to 
purchase food. Overall adequacy of funds increased over the three years monitored, with 
the proportion of women receiving payments increasing from 34% to 59%. Initially, 
payments were delayed. However, performance improved dramatically over the years, 
falling from an average of 100 days delay in year 1 to five days in year 3. In part this is due to 
changes in transfer arrangements and accounting at the national level.  
 
If service fees are effectively removed (see below), that will reduce the justification for cash 
payments to women, particularly in areas where access costs are lower (i.e. some parts of 
the tarai). Given the high population based in the tarai (around 50% of the total), the 
removal of this cash transfer component would generate considerable savings. On the other 
hand, it would weaken the universal appeal of the policy (though households in the tarai 
would be more than compensated by the new national fee exemption component  – they 
would lose NRs 500 in cash transfers but gain NRs 700-7,000, depending on the nature of 
their delivery). 
 
At the same time, the option of increasing cash payments in hill and mountain areas should 
be considered, as real access costs here are twice the level of current payments: mean 
estimates for transport costs were more than NRs 3,000 for hill and mountain areas in the 
2004 costing study (Borghi et al. 2004). In addition, progress on raising facility deliveries has 
been slower here, particularly in hill areas (Powell-Jackson, Neupane, Tiwari, Morrison, & 
Costello 2008), which means that households in these areas will gain less on average from 
the new free delivery component.  
 
There is no clear justification for a flat rate nationwide, given the lower access costs in 
lowland areas and the new component of fee exemption. 
 
In the longer term (after 2017), as access to facilities improves and attitudes towards 
customary site of delivery change, the cash transfers can be reduced or gradually phased 
out. They can be seen as a transitional arrangement to boost demand for skilled delivery.  
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Incentive payments to health workers 
Health workers are currently paid NRs 300 for carrying out deliveries in participating 
facilities or for supervising deliveries at home. The latter component was included in 
recognition of the fact that many women cannot access facilities in Nepal and that 
encouraging trained staff to attend at home was the least-bad option. (The internationally 
approved strategy emphasises the need to get women to facilities so that ‘at risk’ cases can 
be handled quickly and effectively.)  
 
International evidence suggests that incentives to staff can be effective in promoting 
preventive services (where demand is low and facilities and staff get little financial benefit 
from provision, unless incentives are created) (Health Systems 20/20 2007). In Rwanda, 
performance-based payment (PBP) mechanisms have contributed to increased institutional 
deliveries. However, PBP approaches are likely to be most effective for services which can be 
offered opportunistically, such as offering preventive care when mothers and children are 
attending for other curative services. Delivery care is a service which cannot be offered 
opportunistically. Women have to present themselves at the right time, and to have quick 
access when needed, and it seems more likely that action on the demand side (addressing 
community attitudes, women’s empowerment, access, affordability etc.) will be more 
significant in increasing utilisation, particularly in a country with the terrain and access 
challenges of Nepal. This may explain why facility deliveries only increased modestly in the 
first phase of the SDIP, according to the evaluation. 
 
Paying incentives to staff to provide services which are a core part of their job also creates a 
dangerous precedent for public servants of all types (and can reduce team spirit, if paid only 
to certain types of staff). This was a view expressed by a number of key informants, who 
asked the question: ‘why do we have to pay health staff an incentive to do their job?’ There 
was also anecdotal evidence of perverse effects, such as rotating staff from other 
departments onto the maternity ward in hospitals, so that they could receive incentive 
payments for deliveries. This is likely to damage quality of care.  
 
It is however an approach which will be harder to remove than it is to introduce (the 
demotivation of reduction or removal is likely to be greater than the motivation related to 
its introduction). If the decision is taken to remove individual incentives and incorporate 
them into a facility payment, this will have to be carefully managed, and counterbalanced by 
alternative rewards (e.g. better housing; food while providing 24 hour cover etc.). There 
should still be a staff incentive to increase facility deliveries, but these rewards may be 
earned and enjoyed as a team, rather than necessarily as individuals. These ideas are 
discussed further in the recommendations section below. 
 
The continuation of the incentive payment to supervise home deliveries is particularly hard 
to justify. It is possible that this has raised the level of home-based deliveries with a SBA, 
but, as outlined above, we cannot confirm this based on existing data.  
 
Another possible benefit would have been if the incentive had allowed health workers to 
reduce the costs of home-based deliveries for households. MCHWs are reported to charge 
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around NRs 1,000 to clients for a home-based delivery (the costing study conducted in 2003 
found a cost of NRs 600 for home deliveries, but this may have increased in the meantime). 
There is no evidence that this has reduced as a result of the SDIP. Field workers report that 
financial barriers continue to prevent some women from gaining access even to home-based 
care. 
 
The problem of getting women to be able to access facilities remains a real challenge 
however. One approach, which is already underway and is very important, is to invest in the 
health care infrastructure in underserved areas (staff skills, equipment and supplies, as well, 
as, much more selectively, buildings). It is important that the budgetary implications of the 
SDIP do not squeeze this supply-side component, which is widely recognised to be important 
in the Nepali context.  
 
On the other hand, a large investment in birthing centres and training is hard to warrant in 
the current climate of low utilisation - around 100 deliveries per year at a PHCC and 27 at a 
health post according to a recent study (Kolehmainen-Aitken, 2008) - so it is important to 
improve those aspects of quality which matter most to women. It may be possible to set 
aside a small portion of the funds received per delivery to invest in a locally managed 
‘women’s health’ fund, co-managed perhaps by Health Facility Management Committees 
and local women’s organisations. The funds could address the minor quality issues which 
most deter users, which will vary by area, and also to promote awareness in the locality. This 
is discussed further below.  
Providing fee exemption nationally 
The current proposal is to roll out the fee exemption from the 25 low-HDI districts to the 
remaining 50 (i.e. to achieve national coverage). Guidelines for the roll-out are in draft stage 
and are under discussion at national level.  The exemption component has a number of 
potential advantages. By channelling resources to institutions, not staff, it potentially allows 
for improvements in the supply of care, if prices are set correctly and resources managed 
well. Some component of individual incentive can be offered out of the payments received. 
However, these would be established locally, rather than being an automatic and universal 
entitlement. On the household side, fees at facilities remain a significant financial barrier, 
which could be alleviated by the removal of facility costs.  
 
The current proposal is to set a fixed tariff of NRs 700 per normal deliveries in non-BEOC 
facilities, NRs 1,000 for normal deliveries in BEOC facilities, 3,000 for complications and NRs 
7,000 for caesarean sections.  These are based on available information on the variable costs 
of providing these services (see costing section below).  
 
As the variable costs include some component of staff time (which is already paid through 
the government payroll), the tariffs include, in theory, an element of ‘surplus’ which can be 
reinvested by the institutions in facilities, staff, supplies or whatever the locally identified 
priority is. The realisation of this ‘surplus’ will however depend on a number of factors, 
including (a) whether tariffs have in fact been set to accurately reflect average variable 
production costs; (b) the local cost structure (clearly, input costs vary by area and also by 
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level of the health system – the current tariff is set for facilities of all types); and (c) the 
efficiency of the institution in combining those inputs to produce services. 
 
Setting the tariff at a level which reflects real service costs is important. International 
evidence has shown that if facilities are underpaid for delivery exemptions, they will 
circumvent the policy by a range of strategies such as charging women for a variety of 
components and/or increasing charges for other services (Witter, Armar-Klemesu, & Dieng 
2008).  
 
The suggestion of setting a higher tariff for normal deliveries conducted at CEOC or BEOC 
facilities (proposed at NRs 1,000 per normal delivery) has pros and cons. In favour of it is the 
fact that higher level facilities do typically face higher input costs. Set against that is the fact 
that they may be able to generate more revenue from a higher volume of clients. On 
balance, and based on costing analyses, it is recommended that a higher rate (NRs 1,000) is 
paid per normal delivery at BEOC/CEOC facilities, but that all tariffs are subject to review 
after perhaps 12 months of implementation. All payments should be made dependent on 
compliance with quality standards, monitoring and auditing  
 
In annexe 2, a checklist is used to assess implementation issues in relation to the Ama 
programme in Nepal. The checklist was developed based on experiences of delivery 
exemption schemes implemented in other countries (Witter, Richard, & De Brouwere 2008). 
Overall, the SDIP/ SDIP+ scores fairly highly, with most of the issues appropriately addressed. 
However, there are a number of points arising from the checklist which require further 
attention or thought. 
 
One is the clarity of the package. While the current policy focuses on intrapartum care, this 
leaves open the question of cover for postpartum care, and complications arising early in a 
pregnancy. (ANC is already provided free of charge and has reached high levels of coverage.) 
It may be necessary to specify which pregnancy-related services can be charged for. For 
example, hospitals may currently derive significant income from carrying out ultrasounds or 
pathology work. Is this part of the new package, or an optional component of antenatal care 
which families should pay for? The extent of the free care should be clearly elaborated for 
women and for facilities, and also specify which aspects of care of the new born are included 
(for example, all routine care may be provided up to the fifth day post-delivery, or routine 
care may be provided but not emergency care, which may be covered by the wider free care 
initiative).  
 
Ambiguity on cost components to be covered or type of care can lead to opportunistic 
charging by facilities (Witter 2009). If, for example, the payments to facilities cover all care 
up to the point of discharge, then a second payment may be needed if women return to 
facilities with later complications related to the delivery. This situation can however be 
manipulated for provider profit, and so close monitoring of trends will be needed. It should 
also be specified whether women are eligible for a second travel payment, in the event of 
post-discharge complication. 
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The checklist also raises the question of whether the contribution of community staff is 
effectively deployed within the policy. At present, some facilities report paying a small 
amount to community health volunteers who encourage or support women to come to 
facilities for their delivery. This is not reflected in official policy but represents a useful local 
innovation. A note on this could be included in the new guidelines, or it could be left to the 
HFMC to decide on, using the small surplus which it is anticipated the payment per delivery 
will bring.  
 
On the question of the referral system, there is no system at present for discouraging 
women from presenting themselves for normal deliveries at higher level facilities – up till 
now, the cost of delivery itself was a deterrent. Transport payments are fixed, so that too 
should deter women from travelling an unnecessary distance. Physical access is also 
challenging in many areas. This is therefore unlikely to be a major issue. However, the new 
free delivery component means that women may prefer higher level providers – this is 
something which should be monitored in future (relative workload increases at different 
levels of the health system) 
 
The payments for referral cases should be clarified in future – whether referring and referral 
facilities both receive payments for the same delivery; whether and how women receive 
transport cost support for the onward journey; and how these costs are recorded and 
monitored. Our recommendation is that both referring and referral centres should receive 
payments (at normal and complicated rates, respectively). This reflects the fact that they are 
likely to both incur substantial costs for complicated cases. In addition, the intention is to 
deter lower level facilities from retaining women who require more specialised care. There is 
a risk of mis-reporting, which is recognised. Once again, close monitoring will be the key to 
identifying facilities which are abusing this system. Referred cases must be recorded as such 
in the routine forms, and trends should be intelligently analysed. In addition, the payment of 
a second transport fund to the woman should be made on arrival at the higher level facility, 
to ensure that the journey is in fact made. 
 
Costing work has been undertaken at various stages of the SDIP and is ongoing for the new 
developments – the policy in Nepal compares favourably in that respect with equivalents 
elsewhere, where the resource implications do not appear to have been clearly understood 
at the time of the policy’s introduction. However, matching the projected costs with funding 
sources is a current priority (discussed below). 
 
In relation to the clarity of the message about the SDIP, the evaluation found some initial 
confusion at community and facility level about the SDIP (which was quite a complex policy 
to grasp). This has improved over time, as evidenced by improved SDIP funding flows etc. 
However, the current re-design will create a need for a new communication campaign. 
 
On monitoring, the SDIP evaluation suggests that this was not initially well developed. The 
new Ama programme should learn from that experience. Monitoring funds have been sent 
to the districts but the consultants understand that these funds have not been fully used. 
This issue should be investigated. Monitoring at district level will be key to ensuring that the 
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new policy is successfully implemented. Given that travel time to facilities is large, from the 
district centre, an integrated approach amongst the health team makes sense, and is 
supposed to be happening. There should be support for all supervisors in filling in the Ama 
forms, as well as those for other health programmes. The DHO should also report in an 
integrated way on monitoring funds, so that resources from different donors and 
programmes are recorded, and the integrated expenditure on monitoring and supervision 
related to an integrated revenue stream. 
 
In relation to displaying eligibility and benefits at facilities, this was meant to happen with 
the SDIP in theory, but in practice has not been fully observed. This should be integrated into 
the Ama supervision checklist, which is under development within the current guidelines. 
 
On the regularity of funding flows, lengthy delays were documented in the early stage of 
SDIP implementation, but this has improved dramatically.  The introduction of free delivery 
care will increase the importance of this issue, as the implications for service delivery of 
irregular funds will be much more severe. It is therefore important that clear systems for 
transfer and accounting are agreed in advance which allow for continuous funds flows, 
except in the event of a major concern over accountability. 
 
On payment systems, the current suggestion is that the public sector will be paid in advance 
(with accounting for funds retrospectively), while the private sector will be funded 
retrospectively for services delivered. This can work if the flow of funds is fast and efficient. 
The extension of bank accounts for public facilities, which is ongoing, should make the 
process easier to manage. 
 
Detailed monitoring forms have been developed, and there is a provision for regular spot 
checks of women who are reported to have received free deliveries. The good use of these 
monitoring tools will be of paramount importance.  
 
To date, there is no evidence of an increase in CS rates. However, the previous policy 
incentives were either neutral or negative (the same rate was paid for all deliveries, whether 
complicated or not, in the low-HDI districts). In future, there may be some benefits to 
facilities from increasing CS numbers. This should therefore be monitored, and tariffs 
adjusted accordingly. 
 
The financial impact on health facilities should be monitored, with checks to ensure that 
costs are not being shifted onto other services, or into informal payments. This has not been 
considered to date and was less applicable under the SDIP. In future, some case studies of 
hospital financing (taking the hospital as a whole), and how it changes over time with the 
introduction of the free care policies, would give useful insights. These should look at the 
total revenues and expenditures, including user fees, local government contributions, and 
funds from sales of drugs through CDPs or external pharmacies which provide rent to the 
facility.  
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It will also be important to consider the impact of the new policy on individual health 
workers. In some contexts, where health workers are dependent for part of their income on 
user fees, fee exemption can cause a motivation crisis and lead to perverse effects (Witter, 
Kusi, & Aikins 2007). In Nepal, most staff have not been paid from user fees, at least at lower 
level facilities. However, there are high levels of dual practice amongst public health 
workers. The free care may threaten that. The problem is likely to be greater in urban than 
rural areas. Auditing should aim to assess whether staff are implementing the policy 
effectively. The routine spot checks on beneficiary women will provide some information on 
this, but can be augmented by the periodic rapid assessments, or additional studies such as 
a health worker incentives survey1. 
 
There were no baseline data at the start of the SDIP, but the evaluation data can provide 
some of the baseline data for the Ama programme.  Some aspects, such as quality of care 
indicators, require additional measurement, however (though ongoing SSMP activities may 
be drawn on to provide this). 
 
Inclusion of the private sector 
 
The private sector represents a significant part of health sector funding and delivery in 
Nepal. Private sector funding represents just under 63 percent of total funding of the sector 
(Prasai, Karki, Sharma, Ganwali, Subedi, & Singh, 2006). Whilst much (78%) of private 
spending is on drugs purchased at drug stores, significant sums are also spent in private 
hospitals, nursing homes and clinics (between 11 to 15% in the period 2001/02 to 2002/03). 
It is estimated that whilst there were 6,710 available beds in public sector facilities in 
2006/07 that there at least 9,000 beds2 in the private sector (DOHS, 2008). According to a 
study conducted in 2003, the little evidence available suggests that the PFP sector accounts 
for up to 12% of delivery care, and 20% of EOC (predominantly amongst the better off sector 
of society) (MacDonagh, 2003). One quarter of facility deliveries took place in private sector 
in 2006 – double that of 1996 (Pant, Suvedi, Pradhan, Hulton, Matthews, & Maskey 2008). 
 
A simple dichotomy between private-for-profit and not-for-profit, whilst convenient, is not 
necessarily always helpful. The private or non-government sector is diverse ranging from 
large for-profit private medical colleges and hospitals through mission and NGO facilities to 
small rural hospitals and private clinics staffed largely by public professionals during time 
when they are not working in public facilities (dual practice).  Some apparently commercial 
facilities appear to operate on a not-for-profit or at least minimal profit basis with 
substantial services provided at below cost to clients. At the same time not-for-profit 
providers may still offer substantial salaries to workers derived from payments made by 
clients.  
 
                                                      
1
 Such a survey, looking at health worker working hours, client numbers, pay from different sources, and 
motivation, was planned as part of the SDIP evaluation. It was not carried out in the end, presumably because 
of time and resource constraints, but remains a useful tool for understanding the health worker economy . 
2
  Note on Public-Private Partnerships in NHSP July 2008. 
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There is growing interest to utilise the capacity of non-government organisations to deliver 
on NHSP goals. Approaches to ways of working differ across the sector. One approach is to 
view their role mainly as providers of services in areas where the public sector is inadequate. 
Public policy is then aimed at contracting with the sector and regulating behaviour. A wider 
approach is to view non-government sector as partners not only in the provision of services 
but also as financing agents (risk pooling) and the development of sector policy and strategy. 
However, this is a broad issue that requires handling at a higher level than the relatively 
small safe motherhood programme or SDIP sub-programme.  
 
The revised SDIP does envisage a growing role for the private sector. In fact the current SDIP 
already incorporates some non-government providers. NGO facilities and private medical 
colleges already participate in the travel incentives for women. Much of the revenue for 
these colleges is derived from student fees and the incentives programme is one way of 
stimulating the flow of women requiring delivery that is essential to their teaching 
programme. The revised SDIP envisages an expanded role with all private facilities being 
potentially able to participate both in the incentives and free delivery part of the 
programme.  
 
Private facilities are likely to be interested to join for a number of reasons. First, in many 
cases they face low utilisation at present, so there would be little additional cost to filling 
their capacity. Secondly, where the SDIP is implemented in surrounding public facilities, they 
will face falling demand. Thirdly, even where the SDIP+ is offering a rate below their current 
charges (which is not always the case), it could function as a loss leader for them in 
marketing other services.  
 
From the public perspective, there appear to be two core reasons for incorporating private 
providers in the SDIP. The first is to promote access to services. It is clear that there is 
insufficient capacity within the public sector to provide skilled attendance to all pregnant 
women - a key reason why the programme also included an incentive to health workers for 
attending delivery at home. In principle the capacity of the private sector could add 
substantially to the overall ability to provide skilled delivery care. The concentration of 
private facilities in larger urban areas means that in practice the sector may not enhance 
access substantially.   
 
A second reason is that greater choice of facilities could act to stimulate competition in a 
way that increases the quality of services. This advantage is highly dependent on whether 
the agency distributing funds - in this case FHD, DoHS, through D(P)HOs, is able to monitor 
the quantity and quality of services. If monitoring is not adequate, then rather than 
competing for better quality, incorporation of providers that are not historically used to 
reporting to the public sector could reduce quality of service. In addition loose contracting 
and monitoring could raise the potential for abuse in the form of mis-reporting of deliveries 
to capture more funding.  
 
There does indeed appear to be limited evidence internationally that contracting can 
improve quality (Palmer & Mills, 2006). The evidence also suggests that gains are heavily 
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dependent on strong monitoring operating on a small scale: the advantages quickly dissipate 
when programmes are scaled up and made dependent on existing public sector capacity to 
monitor and regulate services.  
 
If care is taken to establish adequate monitoring systems, the contracting of private sector 
providers represents a good opportunity to encourage the improvement of standards in the 
sector and obtain information for monitoring. In Nepal, as in many low and middle income 
countries, it is extremely difficult to maintain standards even within the public sector. 
Private providers are also often reluctant to report on their activities. This is illustrated by 
the lack of information on private providers in the HMIS: the 2006/07 Annual Report 
suggests that only a small proportion of private institutions regularly reports on their 
activities (DOHS, 2008). Monitoring and regulating private providers is usually based on 
minimal licensing, which at best may only ensure basic adequacy of the facility at time of 
registration and at worst can simply work as a way of encouraging rent-seeking behaviour 
amongst bureaucrats (Hongoro & Kumaranayake, 2000; Kumaranayake, 1997).  
 
Increasingly countries are beginning to turn to systems of opt-in voluntary accreditation as a 
way of focusing regulatory activity and resources to improve performance. The aim of most 
accreditation is to encourage providers to voluntarily comply with higher, process and 
output-led standards on a regular basis. The incentive for providers is generally to use the 
accreditation to encourage individuals to use their facilities or as a way to win scarce 
contracts with public sector purchasers. Private providers in both Thailand and India have 
utilised both ISO system standards and international versions of the US JCAHO (Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organisations) process and output standards to 
create market advantage over competitors in order to attract demand (Ensor & Weinzierl, 
2007). Some systems have gone further to replace defective licensing as well as and 
encouraging general improvements in quality. In Brazil, for example, the Organizacao 
Nacional de Acreditacao (ONA) offers a two part accreditation to facilities (La Forgia & 
Couttolenc, 2008). The first stage requires a facility to fulfil basic criteria for licensing such as 
health and safety and minimum staffing for services offered. Facilities then achieve higher 
accreditation over time by improving their process of care, based on an agreed development 
plan. 
 
The current revised guidelines for SDIP permit the incorporation of private facilities into the 
scheme provided that they conform to criteria on specifications for providing BEOC care, 
including legal registration with public authorities, readiness to provide 24 hour delivery 
care, adequate equipment, minimum of 15 beds, adequate water, electricity, supplies and 
ambulances, and procedures for disposal of waste.  
 
In addition they will be required to report on their activities in line with HMIS and EOC 
requirements. Although these facilities will be paid on the basis of normal, complicated (1 
category of payment) and caesarean section, they should be required to report in detail on 
the types of complications and other indicators required by the EOC monitoring framework 
through the HMIS. This will permit later audit on the incidence of complications, 
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comparisons between facilities and provider types and later supervision and follow-up 
monitoring.  
 
These minimal criteria (certification) could be supplemented by a requirement that facilities 
enrolled into the programme demonstrate quality improvement in the processes of care and 
preparedness to provide basic and comprehensive EOC. The contents and means of 
monitoring this second level certification (or accreditation) will require considerable input to 
work out suitable standards. Such standards should apply equally to public and non-
providers. Conceivably it might form the basis of more general accreditation of facilities for 
other health services. At this stage it is important that the guidelines reflect an intention to 
introduce such a programme.  
 
Two further issues related to private sector contracting merit comment. The first is that the 
cost and financing structures of non-government providers differ substantially from public 
sector providers. In particular, many private for profit providers may have to cover their full 
costs of service in the absence of other forms of funding available to public providers, 
through regular line item budgeting, and some NGO providers in the form of subsidies from 
international or local organisations. This is likely to make the payments available through 
the scheme unattractive to many. At some stage if the scheme is serious about the inclusion 
of non-government providers, a more complex payment and contracting system may be 
required that differentiates the payments offered to different types of organisation.  
 
It is probably premature to introduce a multi-tariff system at the moment for two reasons. 
The first is that it would be wise for regulatory reasons to encourage gradual private 
participation, rather than pretend that it is possible to safely contract with many providers 
immediately. Starting initially with providers that require lower payments to survive either 
because they have lower costs or because they have other forms of revenue (e.g. medical 
colleges and many NGO providers) will help to make the task more manageable. The second 
reason is that there is simply not enough information on costs of these services to permit an 
accurate development of reasonable tariffs for different providers. More work in this area 
will be required which is likely to go beyond the contracting of safe motherhood and extend 
to other forms of health service contracting.  
 
A second issue is whether private providers should continue to be permitted to take paying 
delivery cases, in addition to those they provide free of charge under the delivery scheme. 
The current revised guidelines prohibit taking payments for delivery care for patients in 
facilities enrolled in the free delivery scheme on public wards. They are still able to take 
payments for those choosing to pay for a private cabin. There is a concern that this could 
deter private providers from enrolling into the free delivery scheme. This is a legitimate 
concern, overlapping with the need, discussed earlier, to recoup the full cost of services. 
Against this must be set the countervailing concern that if hospitals are permitted to charge 
for some deliveries then they may essentially use free care to fill unused capacity, whilst 
attempting to extract payments from women where possible. In more popular facilities 
paying deliveries could be preferred to non-paying. This could well undermine the principles 
of the free delivery scheme and send out mixed and confused to the population (that will 
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already be confused by the plethora of policy statements on SDIP, free delivery and free 
care issues in recent months).  
 
In addition to the inclusion of existing non-government providers into the free delivery 
scheme a more active role might be developed by requesting bids to provide services in 
areas that are not currently well served by public or private health facilities.  Such contracts 
are more complex since they would need to incorporate the capital costs of developing 
services as well as reimbursing recurrent expenditures. In addition, given the risk of 
developing services, they are likely to need to guarantee to pay for a volume of service over 
an extended period. The capital dimension to reimbursement may make it initially difficult 
for GoN to undertake such contracting but this could be an area where a development 
partner is invited to provide direct funding and initial responsibility for contracting. Although 
still not common, such contracting is beginning to be used to help extend access to basic 
services in other countries. In parts of India, for example, partnerships of this type are being 
used to increase access to primary care in under-served areas (Ghanashyam, 2008; RTI 
International, 2008).  
 
Such partnerships are uncommon in Nepal.  Attempts at involving the private sector in 
management of tuberculosis have been made with mixed results (Hurtig, Pande, Baral, 
Newell, Porter, & Bam, 2002). Whilst a number of non-government providers joined a 
scheme to involve them in the implementation of the national TB programme public sector 
agencies, in particular the National TB Centre found that it lacked resources to engage fully 
in supporting non-government providers to deliver good quality services and monitor their 
quality. Private providers tended to be happy to deliver curative services but were less 
enthusiastic about conforming to a uniform reporting system (which is crucial in monitoring 
the overall implementation of the programme).  If the non-government sector is to be 
encouraged to provide delivery services in remote areas, it will be important to learn from 
this experience and ensure that there is capacity, either within the public sector or through 
a contracted management agency, to contract and monitor services (including preventive 
and promotional services).  
 
Involvement of the non-government sector in the free delivery scheme could yield gains in 
extending access to services. But these gains are only likely to be realised if adequate 
thought and resources are given both to the regulation and accreditation mechanisms and 
contract and monitoring.  The novel nature of such partnerships in Nepal suggests the need 
for a gradual approach to the incorporation of the non-government sector alongside 
substantive investment in these mechanisms.  
Integration with the wider free care policy 
User fees started in the 1970s in Nepal, in response largely to drug shortages. The second 
long term health plan (2001-2017) envisaged the spread of cost recovery via user fees, 
aiming for full cost recovery with health insurance by 2017 (HSRSP 2008). However, thinking 
on this issue has changed and ‘Health for all’ is now enshrined in the interim constitution as 
a fundamental human right.  
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Over the past 18 months, a series of reforms have been brought in which have extended the 
right to receive health care without payment for fees or drugs, first to targeted ‘vulnerable’ 
groups, then to all patients at sub-district level, and now, in this financial year, it is hoped, to 
all health care up to the district hospital level. There are also further plans under discussion 
to extend free care for selected groups (such as the poor, and elderly) at the national level. 
This rolling approach to removing user fees has resulted in some confusion about the 
current situation, with different key informants providing different information on which 
elements are now provided free of charge. 
 
Under the previous system, facilities charged a small fee (NRs 5-10) for registration, and 
patients also paid for drugs which were out of stock (which was common), either in regular 
pharmacies or community-run pharmacies.  The HFMCs were able to set fee levels and to 
use the funds for minor expenses. Some areas also had community health insurance. 
According to the health facility efficiency survey of 2004, user fees contributed more than 
50% of total revenues at regional hospital level, but at DH and HP level only 8% and even 
less below (5% at PHCC; 3% at SHP). In that context, it should be relatively easy to remove 
fees for lower level facilities (though this does not necessarily tackle the issue of 
catastrophic costs for more complex procedures). 
 
The policy of free care is currently operationalised by boosting funding for essential drugs 
and providing small payments to health facilities per outpatient visit. Facilities are no longer 
permitted to charge for registration or for 32 essential drugs (at HP level) or 22 essential 
drugs (at SHP level). Sub-district facilities receive NRs 5 and DHs receive NRs 25 per 
outpatient. The size of payments for inpatients is currently unclear.  
 
This has been added to the programmes which were already free (FP, immunisation, ANC, 
TB, malaria, kala-azar, leprosy, snakebites, IMCI, STDs, HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment). 
 
RTI has estimated the costs of free health care at district level and below at USD 15-21 
million USD per annum, depending on the demand scenarios.  
 
There is as yet no formal assessment of the impact of the policy, which has in any case been 
evolving over time. However, early evidence suggests that outpatient visits have doubled at 
HP and SHP levels in the first 6 months of 2008, compared to the year before (RTI 2008).  A 
non-representative survey found no evidence of increase in utilisation by the poor or ultra 
poor but the user classification by health workers was recognised not to be reliable. 
Inpatient visits at PHCCs showed an even bigger increase (six to ten-fold). Most (91%) of 
facilities had received directives on the operationalisation of policy and 76% of facilities 
reported at least one set of reimbursements (most had received three). One third reported 
drug stock outs at least once during the period (but there was no evidence of how that 
compared with the period before free care). Most reported one stock out, and of just a few 
drugs. 
  
It is not within the scope of this study to assess the design and effectiveness of the free care 
policy. However, it is clearly a significant national initiative, which will face many of the same 
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issues as the SDIP/SDIP+. It is therefore important that lessons are shared between the two 
initiatives and that, in the medium term, there is integration between them (and with the 
many public health programmes which are also free and managed in a vertical way). At the 
facility level, service delivery is conducted in an integrated way, and monitoring by the 
district should increasingly be conducted in an integrated way too (see above). Financial 
management of resources at facility level is also integrated (funds generated by the Ama 
programme, for example, feed into the facility budget as a whole – there is no restriction on 
how they are used). The final step will be integration of funding flows at and from the 
national level.  
 
There is some evidence that integration of funding streams (e.g. through a SWAP) has led in 
other countries to a fall in spending on maternal health (Ensor et al. 2002). This is a 
particular risk if the costs of the wider free care policy are hard to sustain. The existence of 
the cash payment to families component is another anomaly, which supports the need for 
separate funding. In the medium term, it is therefore desirable that funding flows for the 
Ama programme (including technical support and overhead costs for monitoring etc.) are 
earmarked, whatever the channel of disbursement.  
 
The maternity services are a core component of care, and upgrading of facilities and training 
has a knock-on effect for other care provided, just as maternity revenues are a core 
component of health financing at facility level. 
 
Over time, the following gradual, well-planned steps towards integration are advisable: 
 The funding for Ama is integrated into the national budget and financial 
management systems (while still ear-marked) 
 A free care package is developed which plans for all services, including maternity 
 Sector and sub-sector TA is integrated so that support is given to extending access to 
quality care for all essential health care services, including deliveries. 
 ‘Free care’ is built into general financing for health facilities, with continued strong 
reporting and monitoring, however, to ensure that quality and quantity does not 
drop. This will be facilitated if access improves to the extent that the cash payments 
for transport are no longer necessary, particularly in tarai areas. 
Decentralisation 
Decentralisation has been on the agenda for a long time in Nepal, but its implementation 
has been hampered by conflict and political uncertainty. At the present time, a new 
constitution is being debated, with a planned but as yet uncertain federal structure. 
Discussion of the impact of decentralisation on the SDIP/Ama is limited by the uncertainty 
about how political decentralisation will progress. 
 
In general, the rationale for decentralisation in the health sector is to improve the 
responsiveness of services to local needs and/or to improve efficiency through better 
allocation and use of resources. Some studies report success in this domain. However, 
others report on a range of problems linked to decentralisation, including a de-prioritisation 
of health, a tendency to focus more on curative care (within health spending) and disruption 
Strengthening the SDIP in Nepal, Ensor and Witter for DfID, 2008, 29 
to previously successful vertically managed programmes. This is a particular worry for the 
SDIP, which has been working hard at strengthening its systems and controls. 
 
The literature on decentralisation distinguishes between ‘decongestion/deconcentration’ 
(passing of decision-making power to lower levels of the health system), ‘devolution’ 
(passing of decision-making power to local government bodies, and ‘delegation’ (passing of 
power to semi-autonomous bodies (Mills & et al. 1990). Of these three, the first option 
tends to offer most control by national ministries, as decision-making is passed to staff 
within their supervision structure. Devolution, by contrast, passes resources to non-health 
sector staff and allows for the transfer of resources between different sectors.  
 
The effects of decentralisation in various forms are influenced by the extent to which 
decision-making ‘space’ is offered over important areas, such as budgets, staffing and/or 
service provisions. The capacity of local actors and the nature of local accountability 
structures are also very significant in determining the impact of decentralisation (Bossert 
2008). Transfer of powers can be abrupt or gradual, and can be differentiated by function, 
with wide ‘space’ in relation to certain aspects, and very little ‘space’ in relation to others. 
Evaluations of decentralisation are hampered by the fact that it is usually undertaken 
alongside other component of health sector reform (Ensor & Ronoh 2005). 
 
The high national importance of the SDIP/Ama and the large volume of funds being 
channelled through it, combined with the need for accountability to donors for the 
resources, suggest that, in any moves towards integration of funding flows (with other 
budget lines, e.g. for free care) and towards decentralisation, the resources for programme 
should be earmarked, at least in the medium term. In Ghana, earmarking funds for 
reproductive health helped to preserve activities despite delays and rigidities in general 
government funds (Mayhew 2003). Whether this earmarking is applied to a ‘vertical’ funding 
channel from the MoHP, or to a ‘horizontal’ fund managed at local levels, is not of prime 
importance, as long as the funds are ring-fenced and cannot be used for other purposes. 
Other supporting arguments for continuing earmarking of fund include: 
 
 The desirability of having a uniform package available nationally (there are practical, 
political and equity reasons why this is desirable) 
 The development of new modalities of inclusion for the private sector will also 
require careful development, and there is a risk of local ‘capture’ 
 The fact that decentralisation will require considerable investment in building local 
capacity to manage resources effectively and to strengthen local governance 
mechanisms, and this process will take time 
 
Paradoxically, decentralisation usually creates a need to strengthen vertical ‘technical’ 
controls at the same time as horizontal links are being pursued. Enforcing financial and 
activity reporting to the national level, from districts, will be an important part of that 
process. At the national level, it is also important for the MoHP to develop new skills to play 
its role as steward and regulator of health markets. 
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Monitoring  
The new SDIP guidelines aim to stop the home delivery incentive for both reporting and also 
SM reasons. It is important to stress, however, that stopping home delivery incentives does 
not eliminate the issue of reporting. The CREHPA study also identifies mis-reporting of 
institutional deliveries although the numbers are quite small (8%) and are well within 
expected thresholds for mis-targeting of scheme effectiveness. It is also possible that 
stopping the home delivery incentive could shift rather than remove the issue of mis-
reporting at peripheral level. The same health workers that mis-report home deliveries will 
still be working in health posts and sub-health posts. The relatively light peer-monitoring at 
this level and the desire to extend the scheme to lower level facilities reinforces the need to 
ensure that supervisional audit of reports at this level is still possible. In some cases 
monitoring may be relatively simple – examples are given where more deliveries are 
reported for the incentive scheme than the birth rate and population of the area suggests.  
In other cases mis-reporting will be more subtle. Extension to the private sector raises a 
further challenge in this area.  
 
Health financing schemes such as SDIP have considerable potential to influence the 
behaviour of providers and patients. Whilst the intention is to use incentives to increase the 
take up of effective services, it is inevitable that some incentives to encourage inappropriate 
services will also coexist. In the case of the SDIP and free delivery care, such potential 
behaviour includes: 
 
 misreporting by facilities of number of deliveries to increase payments 
 categorising deliveries as complicated to receive higher payment 
 over-provision of caesarean sections 
 over provision of ‘minor’ complications, which generate higher revenue than their 
costs  
 referring more expensive complications to other facilities to avoid incurring costs 
that exceed payment 
 referring excessive numbers of women, without treatment, to gain first-level 
payments without incurring any costs 
 
Whilst the design of a scheme can reduce these behaviours it is almost impossible to 
eliminate them altogether. Also reducing one type of perverse incentive can lead to others. 
The maternity voucher scheme in Gujarat, for example, differs from the Nepalese scheme in 
reimbursing providers a flat payment regardless of type of delivery (Bhat, Singh, 
Maheshwari, & Saha, 2006). This ensures there is no incentive to undertake unnecessary 
caesarean sections. But at the same time there is an incentive to skimp on services offered 
to women and also to persuade more expensive (complicated) cases to seek care elsewhere.  
 
Given that avoiding all possible perverse incentives is not possible, monitoring the 
prevalence of the most important likely issues becomes extremely important. It is strongly 
suggested that the routine forms include a classification by type of delivery complication (as 
opposed to the current three-fold classification relating to the tariff, which is divided into 
normal, complicated or caesarean). If all participating facilities were capturing and reporting 
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complications by cause, it would be possible to review and therefore investigate any 
anomalies that arise in terms of profile of complications and as a percentage of all deliveries 
classified as complicated. With EOC data from 13 districts over 10 years we have a good 
basis from which to compare the profile of complications (which has changed little over this 
period). 
 
Monitoring will take many forms. These should include: 
 
1. regular reporting and supervision 
2. audit of patterns of delivery and payments (intelligent analysis at district, regional 
and national level) 
3. rapid assessment, to be carried out 1-2 times per year 
4. periodic evaluation of impact (every few years) 
5. accreditation can also be used as a monitoring tool (see above) 
 
Payments to facilities should be made conditional on compliance with reporting 
requirements. In addition, the role of the regional monitors should be strengthened. 
Local accountability could also be developed in pilot areas through closer involvement of 
women’s groups in overseeing the Ama programme and in managing the ‘quality 
improvement’ portion of the funds (for example, 300 NRs per delivery). This could be used 
to address the minor practical issues which improve the service for users (e.g. somewhere 
comfortable for their carer to sleep), as well as rewarding staff who work hard (for example, 
providing food for staff who work over-time or at night). Ideally, these funds should be 
matched by VDC contributions, to increase local ownership, and these contributions should 
be monitored to indicate the local commitment to the programme. Other sectors can also 
be involved – for example, the local primary school teacher might play a useful role on the 
Ama committee and also in publicising the Ama programme in the community. 
 
Given the importance of effective monitoring, it is important that adequate provision is 
made for the costs of monitoring and evaluation and these are incorporated into the budget 
for free delivery. We recommend that provision for at least NRS 34 million per year is made 
for these activities (Table 1). This includes national level supervisors, but not the additional 
international supervision and TA that is provided through SSMP. 
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Table 1: Monitoring and evaluation of SDIP+, including free delivery (draft budget in NRs & 
USD) 
 
 
Costing of the SDIP 
In this section of the report, we examine the unit and total costs of the proposed free 
delivery care scheme. This section has two main intentions. The first is to examine the costs 
of delivery care compared to the available resources and suggest whether the tariffs 
proposed in the new SDIP guidelines are sufficient. The second intention is to examine the 
overall funding requirements for free delivery care. 
 
Unit costs 
There is no recent survey of the unit costs of health services that focus specifically on 
delivery or general medical services. Recent costing, such as those undertaken by RTI, made 
use of earlier studies undertaken in 2003 to 2004 (Borghi, Ensor, Neupane, & Tiwari, 2004; 
Nepal Health Economics Association, 2004). We understand that RTI will undertake a new 
costing study in the near future which will provide a much needed update to these figures. 
In the absence of more recent information, we also utilise these earlier studies to derive unit 
costs. In addition, normative capital costs are obtained from the costing of standard 
equipment packages undertaken by SSMP.  Costs are divided into four components: 
1. General facility costs, reflecting the cost of personnel and running costs of each 
facility. These costs are derived from the Nepal Public Health Facility Efficiency 
Survey (NPHFES) and updated for changes in prices. 
2. Supplies cost (medicines, gloves, syringes etc) based on the normative costing 
undertaken in the Borghi et al study and cross-checked against current experience in 
facilities.  
3. An allowance for minor quality improvements. Under the original SDIP this was given 
directly to individual as payment for the delivery. We suggest that in the new 
Strengthening the SDIP in Nepal, Ensor and Witter for DfID, 2008, 33 
guidelines it is used to make small quality improvements, including general incentives 
for staff. 
4. Capital cost of equipment. This is the delivery-specific costs of equipment required to 
provide an appropriate level of care. Costs are based on an annualisation of the basic 
equipment packages, apportioned to delivery care and divided by the expected 
number of deliveries. 
(Details of the assumptions made for the costing are provided in Annexe 3.) 
  
For funding flows, there are two principal sources:  
1. Regular budget allocated through District Health Offices (DHOs), primarily to finance 
personnel costs but also providing resources for overall running costs and medical 
supplies. The new free care policy is providing additional resources for facilities 
although it should be noted that this is largely not for delivery care, where the 
consumable costs continue at present to be mostly financed by charges. 
2. The proposed subsidies of NRs 700 for a normal delivery, NRs 3,000 for a 
complication and NRs 7,000 for a caesarean section.  
In addition, facilities receive resources for recurrent costs from Ministry of Local 
Development committees (VDCs or DDCs) and external development partners. Since these 
sources vary substantially from facility to facility these flows are not included in the analysis. 
Funding for capital improvements are provided separately by the DHO.   
 
Calculations in Table 2 suggest that the recurrent costs of a normal delivery at PHCC is NRs 
1,094 and at health posts NRs 1,101 RS3. These costs are just offset by the resource flows, 
leaving a small surplus. A recent survey found that PHCCs on average deal with 100 
deliveries per year and Health Posts just under 30 (Kolehmainen-Aitken & Shrestha, 2008). If 
the number of deliveries in each facility type doubles, the surplus increases to between NRs 
58 and 72.  
 
In district hospitals the average cost for a normal delivery is estimated at NRs 1,579.  It 
should be noted that this cost may not include all the supply costs incurred by the woman 
for delivery. The Borghi et al study found that while official hospital charges amounted to 
NRs 678, other costs (including the value of food, items brought for the newborn baby, 
washing materials and gifts for the staff) amount to a further NRs 1,300. Not all these items 
would be covered by the free delivery funding (which is probably appropriate).   
 
                                                      
3
 The main workload of PHCCs and Health Posts are recorded outpatients. The resource required to treat one 
regular outpatient is clearly not equivalent to that required for one delivery. It is estimated that a delivery 
requires around 2 hours of input (often spread out over  a longer period). In contrast an outpatient visit such as 
trauma or first antenatal visit is expected to require around half an hour of input. Based on this we make the 
assumption that the resources required for a delivery are four times those required for other outpatients.  
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Table 2: Unit cost and resources under free delivery care (Ama programme (NRs) 
 
District 
Hospital
PHCC Health Post DH C-
Section
DH 
Complication
Costs
General facility cost
999         515              521                5,993           4,495                
Supplies (e.g. medicine, 
gloves, SD kit) 280         280              280                2,000           1,000                
Minor quality improvements 
(facility & staff)
300         300              300                600              600                   
Total (Recurrent) 1,579      1,095           1,101             8,593           6,095                
Capital equipment (per 
delivery)
1,009      557              565                3,457           3,457                
Total including equipment 2,588      1,652           1,666             12,050         9,552                
(BEOC)(Birthing Centre)(Birthing Centre) (CEOC) (CEOC)
Funding -          
Government Budget 679         437              443                4,075           3,056                
Free delivery Funding 1,000      700              700                7,000           3,000                
Total funding 1,679      1,137           1,143             11,075         6,056                
Balance
Gap (recurrent) 100 43 42 2482 -38 
Gap (total including capital) -909 -514 -523 -975 -3495 
Gap (recurrent, Deliveries × 
2)
         307                  72                    58            3,724                     893 
Normal Delivery Complications
 
 
The funding flow available for a district hospital only appears to be sufficient to cover the 
costs of a normal delivery if NRs 1,000 per delivery is provided (i.e. higher than the lower 
rate of NRs 700). Part of the reason for this is that hospitals often operate at low levels of 
occupancy. Across the country the occupancy in all public hospitals is about 50% while for 
hospitals of between 15 and 25 beds it is around 40%. A higher level of occupancy would 
reduce this cost. Deliveries account for around a third of inpatients, although a smaller 
proportion of bed-days since most deliveries will require less than the average stay in 
hospital for all patients (around 2.2 days). If the number of deliveries doubles, then a surplus 
is possible even with a payment of NRs 700. Yet doubling deliveries represents a substantial 
change in activity and hospitals will be running essentially at a loss until these greater 
volumes are achieved. A payment of NRs 1,000 per delivery would help hospitals to offset 
their costs at a lower level of activity and offer a greater stimulus to improving care.  
 
The new SDIP guideline proposes payments of NRs 7,000 for a caesarean section and NRs 
3,000 for a complication.  The cost analysis suggests that the costs of complications are 
largely covered by the proposed payment and budget funding. Some complications, such as 
eclampsia, will cost substantially more than this to treat and others, such as severe anaemia, 
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will cost less. It will be important to monitor the composition of complications to verify that 
hospitals are not refusing to treat the more expensive complications4.  
 
The current figures suggest that district level facilities will make a recurrent surplus from 
undertaking caesarean sections. It is possible that this could act as incentive to undertake 
too many caesareans. Such a tendency is common in countries where facilities are paid 
according to the number of cases treated. The most egregious examples are in countries 
such as Brazil where rates often exceed 50 or 60 percent - a large part of which is put down 
to providers inducing demand in order to increase revenue  (Brugha & Pritze-Aliassime, 
2003).  It should be noted, however, that an acceleration in rates of caesarean sections 
usually occurs in systems where the levels of payment far exceed the relatively modest 
payments suggested by the SDIP scheme. The rates proposed are likely to be substantially 
less than the price of caesarean sections in larger for-profit private sector facilities. It is 
reported that these can often exceed NRs 20,000 or 30,000. Furthermore, some incentive to 
increase caesarean sections is welcome, given the very low overall rate across the country - 
reported at 2.7% (HMGN, 2007). Yet the danger remains that any growth in sections induced 
by the payment regime might be amongst women where surgical intervention is not 
medically indicated. It will be important to watch the trend in section rates and to monitor 
these trends across types of facility. 
 
The above analysis suggests that the payments proposed, together with the budget from 
government, should be sufficient to offset the cost to facilities of the free delivery policy and 
provide a modest surplus that can be used for general quality improvements. These 
payments are not, however, sufficient to offset the capital costs of delivery. Per delivery, 
annualised equipment costs are shown in the table, based on current workloads. Clearly as 
equipment is used more intensively these costs will fall. Without additional funding it will 
not be possible for a facility to obtain or replace capital equipment that is vital to provide 
good quality safe delivery, BEOC or CEOC care. Yet for the free delivery policy to operate 
effectively services must be upgraded to a level that enables facilities to provide safe 
delivery and care for complications. This demonstrates the importance of combining the free 
delivery payments with supply-side investment. In financial terms, the cost of maternity-
related capital equipment (not buildings) represents around one half of the recurrent cost of 
care. Whilst this proportion will fall as facilities are used more intensively, it implies that 
investment in equipment on an annual basis should equal between 40% and 50% of the total 
spending on free delivery, excluding the cost of buildings.   
 
The cost analysis provides an indication of costs relative to funding flows for free delivery. It 
broadly suggests that facilities will receive sufficient resources to maintain a quality delivery 
service without requiring additional user charges. A number of qualifications are important. 
Timely payment, as discussed above, will be critical to the functioning of the scheme.   
A second concern is that the management of a facility may not utilise the resources provided 
by free delivery to improve maternity care, but instead use the funding for general hospital 
                                                      
4
 Sometimes referred to as ‘cream skimming’, when a provider accepts mainly the lower cost, more profitable 
patients (the ‘cream’) and attempts to reject, perhaps through re-referral,  the more expensive.  
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services. Although the payment should provide some incentive to improve maternity 
services in order to attract more deliveries, this is not guaranteed.  
 
Overall cost of the policy and sustainability 
Projections suggest that the approximate cost of the overall free delivery will be NRs 900 
million in 2009/10, rising to NRs 1,571 million in 2017/18 (Table 3 & Table 4)5.  This cost 
includes three the sub-components that constitute the Ama programme: 
1. The transport payments to women 
2. Free care payments to the facilities  
3. Monitoring and evaluation costs 
The direct costs of the Ama components alone rise from NRs 441 to NRs 748 million across 
the period.  In addition, the general costs of free delivery (facility staffing, operating costs 
etc) and capital costs are estimated. The indirect cost of free delivery is estimated to rise 
from NRs 215 to 384 Million (Table 3). This figure does not take account of improvements in 
facility efficiency and the actual costs could, therefore, be lower. On the other hand, above-
inflation salary rises or costs of other items could inflate this cost. Capital costs are around 
28% of the total cost of services. Capital equipment costs here are annualised and spread 
over the period. In reality, capital spending is lumpy and improving services will require 
substantial spending early in the programme. The figure provided here is indicative but 
demonstrates the financial implications of prioritising important investment in supply, which 
we consider is a pre-requisite tor stimulating the improvement in services.
                                                      
5
 The overall Ama costing was developed by Dr Suresh Tiwari. These data are supplemented by estimates for 
monitoring and evaluation, general facility (budget financed) costs and capital costs.  
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Table 3: Cost of the Ama component of the free delivery policy, NRs million6  
 
 
Note: Population for 2006, 2011, 2016 and 2021 source is Population Projection for Nepal 2001-2021, and for other years is based on the 
exponential growth rate.     
CBR decline is based on the CBR trend of 2001 and 2006 NDHS.     
   
                                                      
6
 All figures at constant prices.  Based on projections developed Dr Suresh Tiwari, SDIP Coordination for SSMP. Based on assumption that 33% of deliveries are undertaken 
at below district hospital level (reflects current HMIS figures), 5% caesarean section rate and 15% complication rate. M&E costing is described in the monitoring section of 
this report.  
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Table 4: Overall cost of free delivery, % of government budget and estimated financing of the Ama component by GoN, NRs million 
Year
Amma 
financing 
required
Indirect cost Capital 
cost Total cost
Total as % 
of GoN 
health 
budget
Amma as % 
GoN health 
budget
GoN 
contribution 
[1]
GoN % of total
Gap 
(constant 
prices)
Gap (5% 
inflation)
2009-10 440.74                              215              247               902 11.8% 5.8% 110              25.0% (331)              (331)             
2010-011 475.11                              238              273               985 12.6% 6.1% 156              32.9% (319)              (352)             
2011-012 516.92                              260              299            1,076 13.5% 6.5% 203              39.2% (314)              (364)             
2012-013 557.36                              282              324            1,163 14.3% 6.9% 251              45.0% (307)              (373)             
2013-014 597.11                              303              348            1,248 15.1% 7.2% 299              50.1% (298)              (380)             
2014-015 636.19             
                 324              372            1,333 15.8% 7.5% 349              54.9% (287)              (385)             
2015-016 674.60             
                 345              396            1,416 16.4% 7.8% 400              59.2% (275)              (387)             
2016-017 712.34             
                 365              419            1,497 17.0% 8.1% 451              63.4% (261)              (386)             
2017-018 747.76             
                 384              441            1,573 17.6% 8.3% 504              67.4% (244)              (378)             
Total 5,358.14                        2,716           3,119          11,193 15.0% 7.2% 2,723           50.8% (2,635)           (3,334)           
 
Note:  [1] Based on devoting 30% of any increase in real spending on health by GoN to the Ama programme   
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The overall public sector health budget for 2008/09 is NRs 14,945 million, of which NRs 
4,086 is the general administration (regular) budget and NRs 10,859 Million is the 
development budget. The GoN portion of the overall budget amounts to NRs 7,499 million. 
The cost of free delivery (2009/10) represents around 12 percent of the GoN health budget, 
of which the Ama component is just under 5.8%. Over the last two years the budget for 
health has risen by more than 10% in real terms7. If we assume a modest 2% annual real 
increase in the budget, the overall cost of free delivery is anticipated to increase to 17.6% by 
2017/18 and the Ama component to rise to 8.3% of total government expenditure on health. 
 
In 2007/2008, the proportion of SDIP financed by the Government of Nepal was 40% but this 
fell to just over 20% in 2008/2009. Given that free delivery represents a high priority 
programme for government, it is to be expected that the cost would be progressively 
absorbed within the national budget. Whether this is done largely depends on how far Ama 
is prioritised to receive any growth in allocations for the health sector. If we assume, for 
example, that real spending by GON on health rises by 2% a year and that 30% of the growth 
in budget is allocated to Ama then the programme could be two-thirds financed by the 
Government by 2007/18.  
 
The gap left to be financed from non-GoN sources falls from NRs 331 in 2009/2010 to NRs 
244 million in 2017/2018 at constant prices. For budgeting some allowance for inflation 
must be included. Inflation since 2000 has averaged around 5%, although at the moment the 
figure is closer to 9%. Assuming 5% inflation, the projected gap, based on the above 
scenario, rises from NRs 331 to NRs 378 million. Whether this represents a rise or a fall in 
foreign currency terms depends on long-run trends in the appropriate exchange rate.   
 
While the budget for the SDIP/Ama for 2008-9 is fully funded, there will be little surplus left, 
on current projections of uptake, from existing EDP commitments. It is therefore urgent that 
financial planning starts soon for FY 2009-10, with support for the new policy sought from a 
range of potential sources, including the GoN.  
 
The overall health financing context for Nepal is constrained. It has the lowest per capita 
expenditure on health in Asia. The most recent NHA estimated that government expenditure 
was $2.3 per capita in 2003 (Health economics and financing unit 2006) – some 17% of total 
expenditure on health. There is some potential for expanding government commitment to 
health from its current rate of less than 6% of overall public spending, but GDP growth has 
been limited (1.9% in 2004/5) and tax revenue is also limited (tax revenue was 13% of GDP 
in 2004/5, while government expenditure was 19% for same year). 
 
Assessing costs, impacts and cost-effectiveness 
 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is a technique for examining whether utilising resources for a 
particular intervention represents good value for money compared to competing uses of the 
                                                      
7
 Budget analysis for 2007/08 and 2008/09 prepared by RTI, personal communication with Rob Timmons 16
th
 
November 2008 
Revising and strengthening the SDIP, Ensor & Witter, Oxford Policy Management, 2008 40 
same resources. If the analysis is to compare no treatment to the programme intervention 
then the measure of cost and benefit would examine all costs and benefits arising from 
delivery care. In the case of the SDIP/free delivery, services are clearly still provided in the 
absence of the policy. A more appropriate approach, therefore, is to compare the additional 
costs with the additional benefits – an incremental cost-effectiveness analysis.  
 
The incremental costs of the programme include the programme costs of the Ama 
intervention, plus other costs, recurrent and capital, incurred by facilities in delivering care 
(described in costing section). In addition it will be important to include the costs of 
supervising and monitoring the programme, including technical assistance provided through 
SSMP/Options. 
 
Measurement of financing interventions is quite different from the measurement of a new 
technology or treatment, which is the usual focus of economic evaluation. In the case of a 
new technology, measurement needs to assess the number of patients treated by the new 
technology and the proportion reporting a good outcome. This can then be compared to 
baseline (counterfactual) which could either be the absence of treatment for a similar group 
and/or treatment using an existing technology. It is important that each group is strictly 
separated so that not only is it clear which of the treatments (none, old or new technology) 
is received by each, but also that they are not receiving other treatment concurrently (or, if 
they are, that this additional treatment is received by all the groups equally). In clinical 
studies it is usually relatively straightforward to ensure that these conditions apply. 
 
Evaluation of public health or health system programmes such as the SDIP is more 
complicated than in clinical studies since it is much harder to ensure that the preconditions 
for accurate measurement and attribution of impact are in place. In particular there are 
problems with measurement of outcome, ensuring a comparator group and controlling for 
confounding factors.  
 
At the level of measurement of outcome, a key issue is that one of the main variables of 
interest, maternal mortality, is an extremely rare event and measurement tends to be 
sporadic and attached to a large confidence interval. This means that trends are extremely 
difficult to isolate let alone attribute to the programme. Maternal morbidity as reflected in 
levels of delivery complications are easier to measure but their meaning is less easy to 
determine. Higher levels of reported complications can, particularly in the initial stages of a 
programme, reflect more complications that are identified and treated - a positive benefit of 
the programme (potential maternal deaths that were avoided or near misses), rather than 
more complications overall. Levels of complications in the population as a whole could 
certainly be seen as indicative of programme success but place an emphasis on 
retrospective, self-assessment that can be difficult to interpret. As a consequence it is likely 
that impact evaluation will need to rely on intermediate measures of benefit such as skilled 
attendance at delivery (or delivery with a skilled attendant), which can be considered as an 
output of the programme. Several sources of data over time and by area of the country are 
available including HMIS, EOC monitoring in selected districts and some surveillance data 
(Powell-Jackson, Neupane, Tiwari, Morrison, & Costello, 2008). 
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Attributing impact of the programme is complicated by two factors. Firstly, the programme 
has been and will be implemented across the country at the same time (or at least through 
roll out that cannot easily be controlled). As a consequence the main comparison is not 
between a treated and untreated group measured at one point in time but population 
groups before, during and after implementation. Over this period it is more or less 
impossible to prevent the groups under examination being ‘contaminated’ by other 
interventions or influences that may influence uptake of delivery care. Outside the health 
sector, general socio economic development, changes in demography and improvements in 
physical infrastructure are likely to have a marked impact on uptake. Inside the health 
sector, other policies general to the sector or maternal health specific, such as improved 
training in midwifery, changes in the facility quality and financing policies such as the free 
care, will also influence uptake. As a consequence it is always extremely complex to isolate 
impact of one element of a programme (current SDIP or revised).  
 
The interrupted time series (and related) approach utilised in the recent evaluation by ICH 
could continue to be used to investigate the impact of the SM and free delivery policy on 
skilled attendance (Powell-Jackson, Neupane, Tiwari, Morrison, & Costello, 2008). Essentially 
this controls for general changes in society that change more or less consistently over time, 
attributing any immediate or gradual post-policy fluctuations in the variable being 
considered (institutional or home delivery with skilled attendant) to the policy itself. The ICH 
work was able to consider the first 15 months after implementation of the original policy, 
compared to four years before policy implementation. Such an approach could usefully be 
applied to new changes in policy (SDIP+). This will require adaptation of the original ‘model’ 
used to predict the impact, to allow for the impact of both the original and changed policy. It 
should be noted, that such an approach may still not capture other system changes that are 
not explained by a smooth time series. In addition if other policies are introduced 
concurrently with the revised SDIP (for example improvements in supply), then what is in 
effect measured is the combined policy impact, rather than the specific effect of SDIP.  
 
The weakness of the time series approach is that it requires an accurate retrospectively 
collected data series and may not control properly for other unmeasured but important 
determining variables. The ICH evaluation made use of household data that was carefully 
matched to control for the impact of other variables on access and costs of care. This may 
provide a more robust measure of impact but it is necessarily more complex and costly to 
collect, requiring primary survey data.  
 
For the reasons described above, undertaking a cost-effectiveness analysis that accurately 
distinguishes the impact of free delivery or even the entire safe motherhood programme is 
clearly not straightforward. This particularly applies to the measure of impact, where it is 
likely to remain difficult to attribute changes in skilled attendance to programme 
intervention. However, we recommend that at least one large evaluation of programme 
impact, which includes collection of household data that is compatible with data collected 
during the previous evaluation, should be undertaken. This should be done during the first 
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three years of the free delivery programme. Such an evaluation could be supplemented by 
time series assessments of impact using the interrupted time series approach. 
 
It is also important that other, less exacting, forms of evaluation are used to help improve 
the implementation of the programme. Rapid assessments, including public expenditure 
tracking reviews, have already pointed to early problems in the implementation of the SDIP. 
These reviews should continue. Costing analysis, even without impact evaluation, can be 
used to assess whether the costs of the programme are sustainable within the context of the 
public budget. Some initial costing is provided in this report. Further costing should be 
undertaken at regular intervals in order to help plan annual budgets of government and 
development partners.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The SDIP has been innovative and has shown significant improvements in performance over 
the first 3 years of its life. Particularly impressive is the way that the government and 
partners have responded quickly and effectively to the problems that have been identified – 
this responsiveness is not the norm in many settings. At local levels, systems of fund flows 
and recording have been built which are functioning – not perfectly, of course, but well for a 
scheme of this complexity. 
 
In our view, the current proposed changes are heading in the right direction (in particular, 
the shift from individual health worker to facility-based incentives, and addressing 
continuing high facility costs for users). This should generate more momentum towards 
facility deliveries, though this shift will probably take place gradually, over time, as 
household mindsets are changed and as further supply-side investments increase access, 
particularly in the hill and mountain areas.  
 
Good information systems and financial controls will be the key to effectiveness and public 
confidence in this policy. The significant design changes will also necessitate a new IEC 
campaign at district and sub-district level. It should also be accompanied by a focus on 
greater local accountability and on addressing the quality concerns of households. Some 
very simple changes could make birthing centres more welcoming for women. It is hoped 
that the facility payment will create an incentive for staff to be more sensitive to women’s 
concerns. 
 
The costing exercise conducted here suggests that tariffs are broadly in line with facility 
costs and that a small surplus should be generated per act. This can be reinvested at the 
facility managers’ discretion, but clearly a self-interested focus would be on keeping the 
customers coming in, by investing in minor quality improvements for customers and 
maternity staff. The overall cost projections show that the policy will not be cheap, 
particularly if matching investments in capital expenditure on facilities and equipment are 
made. However, these investments will benefit the whole package of care – not just 
maternity care. Using reasonable assumptions, the Government of Nepal should be able to 
fund an increasing proportion of the cost, over time.    
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The private not-for-profit and, to some extent, the for-profit sector are already participating 
to a limited degree in the SDIP, and this should be gradually augmented over time. There are 
two reasons for this recommendation. The first is to add to the network of supply, 
particularly in under-served areas. (Although many of the private sector facilities are found 
in urban areas, most of these are expected to self-select out of the scheme, as the tariffs on 
offer are lower than their current charges.) Secondly, a process of accreditation of private 
sector providers is proposed, which should, over time, increase the integration between 
private and public sectors (for quality standards, reporting etc.) and help to lift standards 
across the board. 
 
Integration of funding flows with the wider free care initiative and with a more decentralised 
approach both offer potential in the medium term. At present, there should be a more 
practical focus on supporting integrated district planning and monitoring, and on piloting 
stronger mechanisms of local accountability for managing the Ama programme and funds at 
facility level. 
 
Recommendations 
 
This section summarises the recommendations made in relation to the questions raised in 
the TORs.  
Cash payments to households 
 The cash payments to households should continue in the medium term, and should 
continue to be tiered by ecological zone. These amounts can stay as at present (50% 
of average actual costs), but over time, if response is much higher in the tarai, 
compared to the upland areas, the amounts could be rebalanced to increase the 
support for the hills and mountains (with a possible reduction in the tarai). 
Payments to health staff for facility deliveries 
 The decision to build staff payments into facility payments is wise. We recommend 
that a portion of the facility payment equivalent to the previous NRs 300 paid to staff 
is set aside for quality improvements. These can include benefits for staff, 
individually or as a team, but should not be automatic. Some should also be used to 
make the small changes which can make so much difference to users.  
Payments to health staff for home deliveries 
 The payments to staff for home deliveries have not furthered the original objectives 
of the SDIP, and we support their removal. This change must be complemented 
however by renewed investment in increasing access to facilities (roads, health care 
infrastructure, staff skills etc.).  
National free delivery component 
 This new approach should reduce the high facility costs which users face and should 
therefore improve the progress in increasing facility-based deliveries. 
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 Current tariffs are broadly in line with the costing estimates and with current user 
fees 
 The costing justifies a higher rate (NRs 1,000) for BEOC/CEOC centres. 
 All tariffs should be reviewed in one year, however, to allow for fine-tuning of the 
rates (and to allow for a broader review of early implementation experiences). 
 All payments should be dependent on compliance with quality standards, monitoring 
and auditing. 
 The extent of the free care should be clearly elaborated for women and for facilities 
(exactly which cost components are included, and for which services, pre-, intra- and 
post-partum, and for neonatal care). There are currently some small areas of 
ambiguity. 
 There should be close monitoring of the CS rates and of different types of 
complications, to assess whether there is an undue increase in CS, and/or 
misreporting of categories of delivery. (This means adding the 10 complication 
categories to the form in annexe 3 of the current guidelines.) 
 Both referring and referral institutions should receive payments, as both will incur 
treatment costs. Referring facilities should receive payments at normal delivery rates 
and referring facilities the rates appropriate to the complication treated. Close 
monitoring and auditing will be required to ensure that ‘phantom referrals’ do not 
occur.  
 Similarly, women who are referred should receive two sets of transport payment as 
they will incur two sets of travel costs. The second payment should be made on 
arrival at the referral centre. 
 The smooth transfer of funds – already an issue under the SDIP – will become of even 
greater importance with the free delivery component, and with the inclusion of a 
wider range of providers (see below). Systems for assuring it will be of prime 
importance for the functioning of the policy. 
 Supervision forms should include checks on whether details of the policy and local 
recipients are being clearly displayed at facilities (this could be added to annexe 6: 
the supervision checklist). Other useful additions/alterations to the current reporting 
forms could include a record of maternity staff (annexe 5: quarterly district report). 
 While facilities are free to manage their own funds, it would be useful to have 
reports of how they have been used. Reporting of use of Ama funds could, for 
example, follow three simple categories (service costs; staff benefits; quality 
improvements for users), so that the utilisation of resources can be tracked 
retrospectively and guidelines adapted in response. 
 A new communication strategy will need to be developed as the re-design of the 
SDIP is quite extensive, and will take time, and some resources, to disseminate. The 
SDIP should collaborate with the NHEICC on this. 
 While the budget for the SDIP/Ama for 2008-9 is fully funded, there will be little 
surplus left, on current projections of uptake, from existing EDP commitments. It is 
therefore urgent that financial planning starts soon for FY 2009-10, with support for 
the new policy sought from a range of potential sources, including the GoN.  
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 The importance of continuing investment in extending the supply network and 
improving the availability and quality of care is emphasised here, and the cost 
implications elaborated.  
 The checklist in annexe 2 may be useful for periodic reviews of progress in the 
development of the Ama programme. 
Integration with free basic health care and decentralisation 
 The Ama services are already provided in an integrated way, but funding streams are 
separate. In the short term, this should be preserved, as the wider free care policy is 
developed and established. 
 In the meantime, there should be a focus on supported integrated planning and 
monitoring of different health programmes by the district team. This is happening in 
theory at present, but not always in practice. Integrated reporting on monitoring 
funds should also be a priority. 
 At national and facility level, funding for free care will affect the SDIP/Ama and vice 
versa, so it is important to document their combined impact and the degree of cross-
subsidisation from one to another. Maternity care is a core services and has 
traditionally been an important profit-making activity. The important lessons learned 
through the SDIP process and internationally on the removal of fees should be 
absorbed by those responsible for implementing the free care programme.  
 In the longer term, and particularly as the GoN assumes a greater proportion of the 
funding burden for the Ama programme, the funding flows can be integrated at 
national level. The series of steps for this integration are set out in the report. 
 In preparation for whatever form federalism and decentralisation come to take in 
Nepal, we recommend that the Ama programme supports the piloting of local 
‘women’s health’ funds, to be co-managed by HFMC and women’s organisations. 
They could receive a small component (such as NRs 100) from the payment per 
delivery (thus creating an incentive to boost demand for institutional deliveries). The 
funds could be used to increase awareness of the new Ama programme, and to 
tackle locally identified blocks to service uptake (e.g. means of providing warm food 
at the birthing centre; making centres more comfortable for companion to stay in; 
assistance where onward referral costs are beyond the family’s means etc.). These 
funds should ideally be matched by VDC contributions, to increase local ownership of 
the Ama cause. Routine monitoring of VDC contributions would enable programme 
managers to assess progress. Ultimately, those jointly managed funds could be 
expanded if wider decentralisation and integration of funding streams occurs. 
 Paradoxically, decentralisation usually creates a need to strengthen vertical 
‘technical’ controls at the same time as horizontal links are being pursued. Enforcing 
financial and activity reporting to the national level, from districts, will be an 
important part of that process.  
Inclusion of the private sector 
 There is now one year’s worth of experience of including the PNFP sector and private 
medical colleges in the SDIP. The patterns of uptake should be analysed for early 
lessons on the potential contribution of non-state partners. 
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 The inclusion of the private sector, if carefully, managed, offers opportunities for 
extending access, improving integration, and raising quality in the longer term. 
 We recommend that initially a uniform tariff for public and non-public providers is 
offered, but with a commitment to review this approach within 2 years and possibly 
develop a more sophisticated mechanism. 
 Facilities should meet HMIS, EOC and Ama reporting guidelines, if they are to receive 
payments under the scheme. At present, some report, but most do not. 
 It should also be clear that no payments can be accepted by participating facilities for 
delivery care, unless it is part of a separate ‘luxury’ package, where full costs are paid 
by clients for care in cabins (private rooms). 
 The inclusion should rest on a two-stage accreditation process, in which basic quality 
standards (as specified in the current guidelines) are the first requirement for entry, 
but with an agreement that over 1-2 years, there will be a move to more 
sophisticated service standards.  
 TA will be needed over the intervening period to develop this accreditation process, 
which should form the basis for agreements with public sector providers too. 
 In future, there may be opportunity to develop contracts with the private sector to 
develop new services in under-served areas, with government support for set-up 
costs. The implications of this go beyond the SDIP/Ama – these are sector-wide and 
multi-sectoral issues. 
 Some of the monitoring and audit roles – particularly for periodic independent 
checking of functioning - can also be contracted to private organisations and NGOs. 
 The same paradox that applied to decentralisation (which needs a stronger centre) 
applies to developing a stronger public-private partnership: public sector capacity to 
develop and manage contracts with the private sector must be strengthened for the 
partnership to work effectively (and this has implications well beyond the safe 
motherhood sub-sector). 
Monitoring, evaluation and further research 
 Monitoring will be a key to the success of the Ama programme. It is therefore highly 
recommended that capacity is developed, at district, regional and national level, to 
monitor and audit the Ama programme. There are currently a few key individuals 
who carry out such work very effectively, but this capacity must be broadened and 
institutionalised, if the programme is to be sustained.  
 Monitoring costs should not be under-estimated. Something in the region of 10% of 
the Ama costs should be added for M&E. 
 A range of monitoring and tracking tools should be used, including routine 
monitoring, spot checks within routine supervision, periodic rapid reviews at 
community level, annual auditing and more formal evaluation.  
 The current forms are well developed. Some minor changes have been suggested, 
such as tracking the different types of complications; and monitoring (with simple 
categories) the use of the Ama funds by facilities. 
 Evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the Ama programme will be difficult, primarily 
because of the difficulty of attributing change in a dynamic situation, with multiple 
interventions, and no control areas. We therefore recommend a focus on tracking 
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costs and tracking a range of intermediate output indicators, to give a more 
pragmatic assessment of value for money.  
 We suggest that process based rapid reviews are undertaken on a six monthly basis. 
Available time series HMIS and other data should be collected on a regular basis to permit an 
interim evaluation after the first 18 months of implementation. We also suggest that a larger 
scale evaluation that looks at the effect on utilisation and household finances is undertaken 
after the first 2-3 years of implementation. To ensure adequate baseline data, early 
preparations for this evaluation should be taken, including quality of care data (which may 
be available from on-going SSMP studies).  
 Case studies on health facility financing (particularly at hospital level) would assist in 
understanding the likely impact on the hospital economy and would help with 
planning a more integrated approach to free care generally. At present, for example, 
there is no systematic reporting of revenues from user fees or local government 
sources, so predicting the impact of free care policies is difficult. (For example, it is 
hard to tell whether the free drugs list is having perverse incentives, such as 
increased prescription of off-list drugs.) This would also provide useful information 
for future decentralisation discussions, providing information on patterns of revenue 
and expenditure by facility type and by region. 
 Similarly, very little is known on how health worker support themselves in Nepal, and 
a survey on health workers incentives, and how these link to working practices, 
would provide useful policy information for planning future initiatives. (For example, 
it would be good to know whether free care has any impact on dual practice by 
public health workers.) 
 The SDIP has benefited from close collaboration with technical support partners and 
this collaboration will continue to be important as the programme evolves into this 
new phase with new challenges. 
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Annexes 
 
Annexe 1 Key informants 
 
Kathmandu 
1. Dr. Dirgh Sing Bam    Acting Health secretary- Health, MoHP  
2. Dr Sudha Sharma    Acting  Health Secretary- Population, MoHP 
3. Dr. Babu Ram Marasini   HSRU, MoHP,  
4. Mr. Yogendra Gauchan   Chief, Account Section, MoHP 
5. Mr. Giriraj Subedi    HEFU, MoHP 
6. Mr. Gyanendra Shrestha  National Planning Commission  
7. Mr. Shayam Raj Khanal  DoHS- Finance section   
8. Dr. Bala Krishna Suvedi   FHD, Director 
9. Wilda Campbell    SSMP/Options  
10. Louise Hulton    Options/London  
11. Greg Whiteside   SSMP/Options 
12. Mr. Hom Nath Subedi   SSMP/Options  
13. Mr. Ajit Singh Pradhan   SSMP/Options     
14. Dr Ganga Shakya   SSMP/Options 
15. Mr Rajan Adhikari   SSMP/Options 
16. Dr Rob Timmons   RTI 
17. Devi Prasai     RTI 
18. Sushil Chandra Baral    DfID- health adviser  
19. Susan Clapham    DfID - health adviser  
20. Tim Powell Jackson   ICH/London  
21. Sudeep Pokharel    GTZ  
22. Anand Tamang    CREHPA 
23. Dr. Badri Raj Pandey    Chairperson Nepal health economics association  
24. Dr Shyam Bhattarai   Managing director, Nepal Medical College 
 
Field visits 
 
Mithinkot PHCC- Kavre   
Bhumlutar HP- Kavre   
Jaisithok SHP- Kavre   
Duhlikel PNFP hospital- Kavre 
DHO- Kavre 
Nepal Family Planning Association Clinic- Panchkhal clinic- Kavre   
Bhaktapur district hospital- Bhaktapur  
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Annexe 2 Lessons on implementation of policies to reduce financial barriers to obstetric 
care: checklist for the development of Nepal’s free delivery policy  
 
Lessons based on international 
experience 
Commentary on situation in Nepal Score 
√ =met 
X = not met 
? = partially or  
uncertain 
1. Design of policy 
The policy should be based on a 
thorough situation analysis of the 
main barriers to raising skilled 
delivery (financial barriers may not 
be the most significant factor in 
some contexts).  
The costing study of 2004 indicated the 
significance of financial barriers – the 
policy was developed in response to 
these findings 
√ 
Policies directly addressing financial 
barriers are most appropriate where 
there is: 
 High maternal mortality 
Nepal does have high MMR rates, 
though these reduced significantly in 
the decade up to 2006 (prior to 
significant influence of the SDIP) 
√ 
 Relatively low skilled 
attendance rate at delivery 
Yes, very low rates, both for skilled 
attendance and facility deliveries  
√ 
 High inequalities in access to 
skilled attendance at delivery 
Large inequalities, by ecological zone, 
rural/urban and by socio-economic 
group (DHS data) 
√ 
 Low caesarean rates (below 
5% of all deliveries) and 
inequalities in uptake of CS 
services 
Yes, low rates (3% nationally), with 
evidence of over-use in urban areas and 
very low availability in rural ones 
√ 
 Physical access by population 
to health care facilities 
Access is acceptable in the tarai (where 
almost half of the population lives), but 
very long travel times recorded in some 
parts of the hills (apart from the 
Kathmandu valley) and the mountains 
? 
 Staffing of health facilities 
with at least minimum norms 
of trained personnel  
There are shortages of staff with SBA 
training, though this is being improved, 
with support from SSMP and other 
partners 
? 
 Acceptable quality of care, 
with functioning equipment 
and adequate drug supply 
There are a number of concerns about 
inputs to care and quality of services 
provided. These are being improved 
gradually 
? 
 High out-of-pocket payments 
by households for delivery 
care, relative to household 
income 
This was demonstrated by the 2004 
costing study. Since then, there has 
been a reduction with the SDIP. 
However, the SDIP evaluation suggests 
√ 
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that financial barriers remain significant 
The package of services to be 
covered should address the policy’s 
objectives (e.g. including the 
interventions which save lives and 
cause most economic hardship to 
families) 
The current proposal includes all 
delivery types (complications, CS etc.). 
Post-partum care is also included, but 
guidelines should perhaps be made 
more explicit about this. ANC is already 
free. Assistance with transport costs is 
also included. 
√ 
The policy should be consistent with 
the wider policy environment and 
thinking in government 
The focus of the current government is 
on making health care more affordable 
generally (free general health care is 
now being rolled out for district level 
and below). The Ama programme is 
therefore in line with general policy 
developments 
√ 
The policy should extend to major 
service providers, whatever their 
sector of work, reflecting current 
utilisation patterns 
The SDIP was originally only available 
for public sector providers, but has now 
been widened to include the PNFP 
sector. In the Ama programme, this will 
be widened further to include PFP 
facilities which meet agreed conditions. 
√ 
Eligibility should reflect areas of 
greatest need but also a realistic 
assessment of available resources 
The progamme is national in scale. It is 
currently supported by DfID. Financial 
commitments beyond 2009 are still 
being negotiated 
? 
Additional investments should be 
planned alongside the policy to 
address key supply-side constraints 
(such as staff shortages) and to cope 
with increased utilisation in the 
medium-term 
The SSMP and others are investing in 
supply-side improvements, but the 
challenges are large, in terms of access 
and quality. On the other hand, 
utilisation at facility level has so far only 
increased modestly and many facilities 
are still under-utilised 
? 
The scope for additional demand-
side investments, such as in 
transport funds, should be 
considered alongside supply-side 
approaches, in specific areas of need 
A cash transfer to women has been in 
place and will continue. This covers 
approximately half of the average 
access costs of households. The 
transfers are universally available but 
vary by ecological zone 
√ 
The role of complementary players, 
such as TBAs, should be considered – 
can they be involved in the policy in 
a constructive way? 
There is no formal provision for this at 
present, but there is scope for local 
initiatives. Some facilities do currently 
pay a small amount to community 
health volunteers who bring women in 
for deliveries 
? 
Policies should reinforce the referral There is no system at present for ? 
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process, so that uncomplicated 
deliveries are handled at lower level 
facilities  
discouraging women from presenting 
themselves for normal deliveries at 
higher level facilities – up till now, the 
cost of delivery itself was a deterrent. 
Transport payments are fixed, so that 
too should deter women from travelling 
an unnecessary distance. Physical access 
is also challenging in many areas. This is 
therefore unlikely to be a major issue.  
Conversely, the policy should 
support access to referral care for 
those with medical needs 
The treatment of referral cases should 
be clarified in future – whether referring 
and referral facilities both receive 
payments for the same delivery; 
whether and how women receive 
transport cost support for the onward 
journey; how these costs are recorded 
and monitored etc. 
? 
2. Policy development process 
All key stakeholders should be 
consulted and involved in 
development of the policy. This 
process should engage with 
potential ‘champions’, who can 
sustain the policy momentum 
nationally and sell the policy 
politically 
There has been widespread consultation 
throughout the development and 
implementation of the SDIP. Local 
‘champions’ have emerged from within 
the Ministry  and also within the donor 
community (Ensor, Clapham, & Prasai 
2008) 
√ 
The policy should be carefully and 
realistically costed (based on 
utilisation patterns, caseload, unit 
costs, and projected changes to 
these) and matched with likely 
funding sources (also projected to 
assess likely changes over the 
medium-term) 
Costing work has been undertaken at 
various stages and is ongoing for the 
new developments. The matching with 
funding sources is a current priority 
? 
Policy guidelines should be clearly 
elaborated and communicated to all 
key stakeholders 
The evaluation found some initial 
confusion about the SDIP (which was 
quite a complex policy to grasp). This 
has improved over time, as evidenced 
by improved SDIP funding flows etc. 
However, the re-design will create a 
need for a new communication 
campaign 
? 
Policy should be subject to periodic 
review and revision with major 
stakeholders 
There is ample evidence that the SDIP 
has been amended in the light of 
emerging concerns. The shift to a free 
√ 
Revising and strengthening the SDIP, Ensor & Witter, Oxford Policy Management, 2008 55 
delivery approach is based on evidence 
from the evaluation and rapid reviews 
3. Policy dissemination 
Core messages should be kept as 
simple as possible 
The SDIP, with its three components 
and layered payments, presented a 
communications challenge. The switch 
to facility payments and universal free 
delivery care should, in principle, be 
easier to grasp 
? 
Strategy should be developed for 
active dissemination of policy to 
communities and health workers 
The SDIP evaluation suggests that this 
was not initially well developed. The 
new Ama programme should learn from 
that experience 
? 
Statement of benefits package and 
eligibility criteria should be 
prominently displayed 
This was meant to happen in theory, but 
in practice has not been fully observed. 
This should be integrated into the future 
supervision checklist  
? 
4. Resource allocation 
Funds should be allocated by area 
according to a population-based 
formula, adjusted for service 
utilisation rates and case-mix 
In Nepal, funds were sent to districts 
according to past utilisation, projected 
forwards 
√ 
Other public funding sources should 
be maintained so that the policy 
provides additional resources 
This has not been studied. However, 
there is no reason why the SDIP should 
have negatively affected other sources, 
as it was being externally funded and 
passed through separate funding 
mechanisms 
√ 
Funding should be regular and 
predictable 
Lengthy delays were documented in the 
early stage of SDIP implementation, but 
this has improved dramatically.  The 
introduction of free delivery care will 
increase the importance of this issue, as 
the implications for service delivery of 
irregular funds will be much more 
severe 
? 
5. Payment systems 
The payment mechanism should 
ensure that average production 
costs (or the components that are 
not centrally funded or subsidised) 
are reimbursed (but not over-
reimbursed) for each provider type 
Information on facility costs is limited. 
However, our preliminary estimates 
suggest that the current tariff is broadly 
in line with average actual costs, taking 
into account core costs and existing 
subsidies. Price information also 
suggests that most providers will not 
lose out financially. The tariff should be 
√ 
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reviewed periodically, however, 
especially in relation to the private 
sector, for which detailed information is 
lacking.  
Payments to facilities should either 
be made in advance, based on 
predicted caseload, and adjusted 
periodically, based on reports, or 
paid retrospectively but frequently, 
to avoid cash-flow problems 
The current suggestion is that the public 
sector is paid in advance (with 
accounting for funds retrospectively), 
while the private sector is funded 
retrospectively for services delivered. 
This can work if the flow of funds is fast 
and efficient 
√ 
If based on activities, there should 
be record-keeping which allows for 
independent verification of cases 
managed 
Detailed monitoring forms have been 
developed, and there is a provision for 
regular spot checks of women who are 
reported to have received free 
deliveries. The good use of these 
monitoring tools will be of paramount 
importance. 
√ 
Indicators of cost escalation, 
including caesarean rates, should be 
monitored, and incentives adjusted 
to counter-act over-medicalisation 
To date, there is no evidence of an 
increase in CS rates. However, the 
previous policy incentives were either 
neutral or negative (same rate paid for 
all deliveries, whether complicated or 
not, in the low-HDI districts). In future, 
there may be some benefits to facilities 
from increasing CS numbers. This should 
therefore be monitored, and tariffs 
adjusted accordingly 
? 
The financial impact on health 
facilities should be monitored, with 
checks to ensure that costs are not 
being shifted onto other services, or 
into informal payments 
This has not been considered to date 
and was less applicable under the SDIP. 
In future, some case studies of hospital 
financing (taking the hospital as a 
whole), and how it changes over time 
with the introduction of the free care 
policies, would give useful insights 
? 
If health workers were dependent 
for part or whole of their income on 
user fees, then compensatory 
measures should be built into the 
policy 
Staff have not been paid from user fees. 
However, there are high levels of dual 
practice amongst public health workers. 
The free care may threaten that. 
Auditing should aim to assess whether 
staff are following implementing the 
policy effectively 
? 
6. Management, monitoring and evaluation 
There should be clear lines of 
responsibility (both institutional and 
Responsibility is clearly defined in the 
current draft guidelines. Support will be 
√ 
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individual) for managing and 
monitoring the policy 
implementation process 
needed to ensure that they are applied 
consistently in practice 
Timely monitoring should both pick 
up and respond to problems but also 
flag up successes to generate 
continued financial support 
Past problems have been effectively 
identified and responded to. This 
reflects a strong partnership, which will 
continue into the future, it is hoped 
√ 
Periodic community-based surveys 
should assess actual benefits to 
different socio-economic and 
geographical groups 
The rapid reviews carried out by 
CREHPA have been very effective in 
providing a ‘reality check’ – these 
should be institutionalised 
√ 
Evaluations should be conducted 
periodically, using baseline 
indicators of utilisation, quality of 
care, health outcomes and 
household costs 
There were no baseline data at the start 
of the SDIP, but the evaluation data can 
provide some of the baseline data for 
the Ama programme.  Some aspects, 
such as quality of care indicators, 
require additional measurement, 
however.  
? 
Country experiences should be 
documented and shared, focussing 
not only on costs and outcomes, but 
also on the processes which enabled 
policies to be sustained and to be 
effective, or conversely, which acted 
as barriers 
There have already been some 
publications based on the SDIP 
experience - for example, (Ensor, 
Clapham, & Prasai 2008) – and others 
will be forthcoming from the evaluation 
results.  
√ 
Source: checklist taken from (Witter, Richard, & De Brouwere 2008) 
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Annexe 3 Assumptions used in costing 
 
A series of assumptions were used to develop the unit cost scenarios. 
 
In District Hospitals 
 
General recurrent costs of facility are based on the Nepal Public Health Facility Efficiency 
Survey  (NPHFES)(Nepal Health Economics Association, 2004). This survey was published in 
2004 and the data are already five years old. It does, however, represent the only 
comprehensive survey of health facility costs for all levels of the public system. These are 
increased to take allowance for increasing prices as follows: 
- Staff: assumption is that costs have risen by 50% or 9% a year compounded over 5 years 
- Other costs: risen by 30% or 5% a year compounded over 5 years (inflation has been 
between 2.5 and 9%, but averaged around 5%) 
Total costs are apportioned into inpatient and outpatient costs using the ratio in the FES 
(around 70% for inpatient care).  
 
General recurrent costs (minus drugs and medical supplies which are included separately) 
are divided by the average total number of bed-days for a 25 bedded hospital  recorded in 
the HMIS for 2006/07 (DOHS, 2008). This provides the basic unit cost per bed-day which 
incorporates the costs of staffing, utilities, building maintenance, transport and other 
general recurrent costs of the facility. 
 
In order to obtain delivery-specific costs, general costs are multiplied by the assumed length 
of stay for each condition as follows: 
• Normal delivery – 1 day 
• C-section  - 6 days 
• Complication - 4.5 days 
In PHCC and Health Posts 
 
General recurrent costs are derived from the NPHFES and increased in line with prices (with 
allowance for price increases as for district hospitals).  
 
General recurrent costs are allocated according to the number of patients (based on HMIS 
average for PHCCs and Health Posts for 2006/07) 
 
It is assumed that a delivery case requires the resources devoted to 5 outpatients.  
 
Equipment costs (all facilities) 
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The NPHFES calculates the cost of equipment currently utilised by facilities. It does not 
guarantee that the equipment costed is all that is required in order to provide good quality 
services. Given the importance of adequate equipment for well- functioning delivery 
services, we base the equipment cost on standardised equipment packages developed by 
SSMP for district hospitals, PHCCs and Health Posts.  
 
The costs of these equipment packages are annualised by dividing by the expected life of the 
equipment. An average rate of 8 years is used (some items will last much longer, some much 
shorter). 
 
The cost of equipment is allocated to delivery care as follows: 
- the portion related to labour/delivery care allocated 100% to delivery care 
- the portion related to blood-banking allocated 50% to delivery care (other surgical 
services in DH will require this function) 
- the portion related to general equipment is allocated according to number of bed-days 
Delivery-related equipment costs (non blood banking) are then allocated according to the 
total number of deliveries per year. 
 
Delivery-related equipment costs for blood banking are allocated according the number of 
complicated deliveries per facility. We assume the proportion of complicated deliveries is 
20% in district hospitals. This higher than the current level for district hospitals but roughly 
equivalent to the level recorded across all public hospitals. Given that the intention is to 
upgrade district hospitals to CEOC centres, it is expected that the proportion of 
complications recorded by district hospitals will rise.  
 
Supply costs  
 
Supply costs relate to spending on medicines and medical consumables used in provision of 
delivery care. Costs are based on normative calculations (what should be provided according 
to expert assessment rather than what is actually provided)  undertaken as part of a 
previous delivery care costing study (Borghi, Ensor, Neupane, & Tiwari, 2004) as follows: 
- Normal Delivery – 280 RS 
- Caesarean Section – 2,000 RS 
- Complications – 1,100 RS (a weighted average of the consumable costs of eclampsia, 
severe anaemia, sepsis, and haemorrhage)  
 
 
 
